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FINANCIAL PRIVACY AND THE THEORY OF
HIGH-TECH GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
PETER P. SWIRE*
How would you like the government to have access to the records of
every purchase you have ever made? Most people feel some sort of chill at
that prospect. Although it may be difficult to pinpoint the problem, many
people would feel a loss of freedom and would have a range of other worries
about living in a society where every purchase left inerasable tracks. This
Article examines the topic of financial privacy. One goal of this Article is to
help develop the vocabulary of what might be wrong with too ready
government access to transaction records. An overlapping concern, discussed
more fully in other writings, is how to assess the desirability of private-sector
access to personal financial information.1
There is a privacy paradox, however. In the long term and taking a broad
view, most people are concerned about invasions of privacy that might result
from government access to sensitive financial and other records. But in the
short term, when particular uses of data are at stake, the political system and
many people prefer to let the information be used rather than to uphold
privacy values. Examples include requiring deadbeat parents to pay child
support or tracking the profits of drug smugglers and other money
launderers. In such instances, access to financial data is seen as an important
tool for effective law enforcement. The paradox is that people seem to have a
long-term concern for privacy while making short-term decisions not to
respect it.
Now is an important time to put those short-term decisions into longer-
* Chief Counselor for Privacy, United States Office of Management and Budget; Professor (on
leave) Ohio State University College of Law.  The text of this paper was completed before the author
entered the United States Government, and the views expressed herein are entirely his own.  For
helpful comments, the author thanks Ruth Colker, Jody Kraus, Mark Lemley, Alan Michaels, Alan
Westin, and participants at On-Line Offshore '98, the Telecommunications Policy Research
Conference '98, an Ohio State Law Faculty Workshop, and the Brookings Wharton 1998 Conference
on Financial Services.  Research assistance was provided by James Collum, Mark Davis, and Jane
Higgins.  Financial Support for this project came from an Ameritech Faculty Fellowship, the
Brookings Institution, and the Ohio State University College of Law.  An earlier version of this paper
was published in the Brookings Wharton Papers on Financial Services 1999.
1. See PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 90-101 (1998); Peter P. Swire,
Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal Information, in
PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 3 (1997); Peter P. Swire, The Uses and
Limits of Financial Cryptography: A Law Professor’s Perspective (visited Feb. 18, 1999)
<http://www.osu.edu/units/law/swire.htm> [hereinafter Swire, Financial Cryptography].
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term perspective. As discussed in Part I, payment systems are shifting to
more electronic and more traceable payment mechanisms. The traditional
cash transaction left no automatic link between the transaction and the
purchaser’s name. The modern debit or credit card, by contrast, automatically
places the purchaser’s name into a data file, at least potentially available to
public and private entities after the fact. To get a preliminary sense of the
harms that can arise from traceability, Part I invites the reader to consider the
problems of identity theft, the problems of having government access to each
book and web page that an individual has accessed, and the risks of having
an authoritarian or totalitarian government being able to trace every financial
transaction within its borders. With these harms in mind, this Article
proposes an anatomy of harms that can arise from financial or other
government surveillance: the harms themselves; chilling effects, or activities
foregone due to surveillance; cloaking costs, or actions taken to evade
surveillance; and the burdens of having to comply with surveillance requests.
Part II introduces the metaphor of data entering a “vault 600 feet down,”
and uses that metaphor to understand the range of ways that data can “reach
the surface,” or become accessible. Good procedures, such as careful judicial
oversight, can limit problems that might arise from personal financial data
flowing out of the vault. Where such procedures are not effective, however,
society may decide to allow data to be filtered before it enters the database.
In other words, anonymous financial transactions may be desirable in certain
circumstances, even in a future Internet payment system, just as anonymous
cash payments are common today.
Part III systematically examines the advantages of government access to
financial transaction data. The government has a strong interest in receiving
data relevant to its own financial affairs, such as collection of taxes and
distribution of benefits. The government also has a strong interest in
receiving data to deter, detect, and punish violations of law. Money
laundering laws, with their emphasis on “following the money trail,” turn out
to be at the heart of modern law enforcement demands to have greater access
to financial records. More broadly, government access to information holds
out the possibility of efficiency gains, not just for law enforcement, but in the
overall administration of government.
Part IV examines the possible harms from government access to financial
data. Government officials might themselves illegally use personal data, out
of self-interest or based on other motives. Hackers and other unauthorized
third parties might gain access to the data, especially if many different
government officials can extract data from the vault. As suggested by the
privacy paradox mentioned above, the political system may make short-term
decisions to permit uses of data without giving full consideration to longer-
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term and potentially negative effects. Next, in ways not often considered by
U.S. policymakers, the adoption of surveillance technologies within the
United States may have unforeseen and negative effects on democratic
values in other countries. Even where the American legal and political
system has sufficient checks and balances to permit use of surveillance
technologies, other countries using the same technologies may not. An
additional disadvantage of government access may come in the form of bad
distributional and discriminatory effects. New accumulations of data may be
disproportionately used against the weak by the strong. Finally, the idea of
tracing each web page ever visited suggests how free speech and other
democratic values may be implicated by new financial or other surveillance
technologies. If a society repeatedly opts for surveillance rather than privacy,
then the nature of that society may change over time.
This daunting list of possible disadvantages shows why we should take
seriously the privacy paradox and the issue of financial privacy. It is also
worth recalling, furthermore, how tight the link is between private- and
public-sector databases in the financial and other areas. For companies
operating in the United States, any information in private hands is only a
subpoena away from the government. For companies operating elsewhere,
there may be even fewer legal protections against government access. As
financial databases develop in the private sector, there is a corresponding
increase in the power of government to track each purchase made by
individuals.
This Article does not attempt to answer for all places and all times when
the government should have access to records of financial transactions.
Careful empirical attention is needed in each place and time to weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of government access. The identification of
advantages and disadvantages in this paper, however, should be useful for the
more general task of assessing high-tech government surveillance. This
Article questions whether we, as a society, would like the government to
have access to the records of every purchase ever made. A closely related
issue arises with the growing use of cellular telephones. The government
might gain the technical ability to track every move people (or their phones)
ever make. As technologies continue to develop, such as toward wearable
computers,2 new realms of data collection will become technically possible
(every place visited, every word spoken, and so on). Keeping track of this
data will be enormously efficient for many purposes. It will also raise new
risks, of the sort analyzed in this Article. Societies will have to determine
2. See Wendy M. Grossman, Wearing Your Computer, SCI. AM., Jan. 1998, at 46.
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how to weigh the tempting advantages of high-tech surveillance with its
sobering disadvantages.
I. THE TREND TOWARD TRACEABLE PAYMENTS
At some level, most people understand that the financial transactions of
ordinary individuals are becoming more traceable over time. Many
transactions are recorded today that did not used to be recorded, or that were
recorded only in places that were difficult to find and connect. The spread of
computers and computer networks means that data more easily and
inexpensively move from one place to another. The result can be
accumulation of a detailed dossier about what an individual has purchased.
At least potentially, an investigator may uncover an individual’s spending
patterns over an entire lifetime, gaining incisive and sometimes disturbing
insights into the person’s personality and actions. In a consumer society, a
complete tracking of consumption is very revealing. Concerns about such
tracking lead to calls for financial privacy, for some set of rules and
institutions that will limit the problems created by our purchases becoming
an open book.
This Part explains the differences in traceability as payments move from
cash to checks to electronic payments. It then explains reasons why more
transactions are becoming traceable over time and introduces some of the
categories of harms that can result from such traceability.
A. From Cash to Checks to Electronic Payments
Transactions are becoming more traceable as our society moves from
cash to checks to credit or debit cards. Ordinary cash provides the possibility
of an untraced transaction. Nothing in the exchange of cash leaves any record
linking the purchaser to the purchase. Such a link exists only if some other
action is taken to identify the transaction. For instance, the purchaser might
fill out a warranty card or some other document, or a video camera may take
pictures of a store’s customers. Cash transactions may not be anonymous in
the strict sense because the sales clerk typically sees the purchaser and may
remember the face. A large portion of cash transactions, however, are
anonymous in the sense that neither the seller nor any other party can readily
link the purchaser to the transaction after the fact.
Payment by check leaves more of a record for the merchant, the banks
involved in payment, and the purchaser. Merchants and their clerks can read
the name and other information, such as home address, printed on the check.
The banks involved in payment keep records in order to credit or debit the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/6
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appropriate accounts. The purchaser receives back the checks themselves or
records of the checks. In all of these ways there is more of a record than for
the cash transaction. That record can become very important if the police or
tax authorities investigate the transaction after the fact. At that point, the
checks themselves (or pictures of them) can likely be produced. In a cash
transaction, by contrast, there is often no record to produce.
In a significant way, credit and debit cards are even more traceable than
checks. Historically, banks have usually not created databases for check
transactions that listed the payor, payee, and item purchased. For a bank,
gathering such information from a paper check would require the large task
of entering information about the payor and payee into a computer. By
contrast, credit or debit card purchases usually automatically record
information about the payor, payee, and items purchased. The merchant’s
database will often be able to track every purchase made with the same credit
or debit card. Even more comprehensively, the credit card issuer will have a
record showing the payor, payee, item purchased, date, and purchase price,
and so forth. If there is an investigation after the fact, the merchant and card
issuer databases can be combined. The card issuer database will identify each
place of purchase, and the merchant databases will often allow a detailed
accounting of each item purchased (for example, each dish ordered at a
restaurant or each prescription filled at the pharmacy).
B. Why More Transactions Will Be Traceable
The shift from cash to checks to credit and debit cards shows an evolution
toward creating records, placing the records automatically in databases, and
potentially linking the databases to reveal extremely detailed information
about an individual’s purchasing history. In considering the effects of this
evolution on financial privacy, the next issue is the extent to which people
will adopt the more traceable means of payment.
A good dose of skepticism is in order before assuming that we will
suddenly move to an all-electronic, cash-free society. After all, we are all
familiar with the old claims that computers would result in a “paperless
office.” Few of us, to say the least, work in such offices today. In banking,
the history of the automated teller machine (“ATM”) provides an instructive
guide to how long it can take for new, and seemingly very useful, banking
technologies to take hold. It has taken a full generation for users to
accommodate themselves to ATMs. Even today, use of ATMs varies widely
by age. A 1996 survey showed that only 36% of those above age sixty-four
Washington University Open Scholarship
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have an ATM card, compared with 75% of those aged eighteen to thirty-
four.3
Current payment patterns, moreover, are more heavily weighted toward
cash and check payments than most people would suspect. A 1994 study for
the Bankers Roundtable reported three hundred billion cash payments per
year and fifty-eight billion checks and other paper payments.4 All electronic-
based payments, including debit and credit cards, reached only fourteen
billion transactions per year, or less than four percent of the total.5
Additionally, instead of seeing an abandonment of paper-based technologies,
the number of paper checks has continued to rise, albeit at a much lower pace
than the number of electronic transactions.6
Electronic payments are far more prominent in dollar value than in
number of transactions. The Bankers Roundtable study estimated total
electronic based payments of about $450 trillion per year (including many
large-value business transactions), check and other paper-based payments of
$67 trillion per year, and cash payments of only $2.7 trillion.7 At the
consumer level, electronic payments in 1993 accounted for 18% of the
number of consumer transactions, an increase from 11% in 1980, with cash
at 47% and checks at 31%.8
These statistics reflect our status quo, in which large-value transactions
and many types of business expenditures are generally made in electronic
form. Importantly for the study of financial privacy, however, the large
majority of consumer transactions is made by cash and check. These
transactions are thus not automatically included in databases revealing
individual spending patterns. If consumers use electronic payments more
often in the future, as most observers expect, then the status quo will change,
to one where records more often will be created, put into databases, and
linked to other databases containing personal information. There will be less
financial privacy than has traditionally existed in our society.
With the stakes for privacy now made more clear, this Article will explore
some of the major reasons to expect that consumers will indeed shift heavily
in the coming years toward more traceable electronic payments. New legal
3. See Valerie Block, ATM Cards Hit a Wall: The Next Breakthrough Is Years Away, Bankers
Say, AM. BANKER, Jan. 2, 1997.
4. See FURASH & CO., BANKING’S ROLE IN TOMORROW’S PAYMENTS SYSTEM 49 (1994).
5. See id.
6. See id. at 49-54. The number of checks rose seven percent from 1992 to 1993; credit card
transactions rose at over a ten percent annual rate from 1983 to 1992; and debit card use has soared
from a low base in the 1980s. See id.
7. See id. at 49.
8. See id. at 50.
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rules may emerge that encourage or require easily traceable transactions. For
instance, the government might ban anonymous payments over the Internet
or extend the current rules that require record keeping for cash transactions
involving over $10,000. Beyond the effect of new legal rules, consider five
market-based reasons why individuals might choose to have a greater
proportion of their transactions in an easily-traced form: affinity programs,
Internet purchases, security (antitheft) protections, auditing advantages, and
electronic benefits programs.
1. Affinity Programs
What would you do to get frequent-flyer miles? What have you already
done? One advantage of electronic payments is that the consumer can
automatically receive credit in all manner of affinity programs—airlines,
rental cars, hotels, grocery stores, cashback programs, and many more.
Issuers of electronic payment cards (stored-value, credit, and debit cards)
face stiff competition in creating consumer loyalty to their cards. Affinity
programs give a reason for consumers to use one issuer’s cards again and
again. In the context of our discussion, affinity programs also give consumers
a strong reason to use electronic payments rather than cash or checks.
2. Internet Purchases
Ordinary green cash does not work over the Internet. Nor does the
traditional paper check unless the consumer is willing to wait days until after
the check has reached the merchant and been accepted. To date, Internet
commerce has been dominated by the fully-traceable credit card.9 As Internet
commerce expands rapidly in coming years, it is quite possible that credit
cards and other traceable payment systems will continue to predominate. It is
technically possible to conduct strongly anonymous transactions on the
Internet,10 but law enforcement officials have lobbied aggressively against
anonymity, arguing instead for escrow of encryption keys and enforcement
of money laundering laws. In ways that are less appreciated, even if strong
encryption were permitted, there are compelling market and other reasons to
expect that the overwhelming majority of financial transactions would not be
anonymous.11 The rise of Internet commerce thus likely brings with it a rise
9. See Russell Stevenson, Jr., Formulating Public Policy for Electronic Commerce, ELEC.
BANKING L. & COMMERCE REP., June 1998, at 16 (“By far the most common type of payment
instrument being used by consumers in electronic commerce today is the conventional credit card.”).
10. See David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, SCI. AM., Aug. 1992, at 96.
11. See Swire, Financial Cryptography, supra note 1 (highlighting the impossibility of lending to
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in traceability.
3. Security and Biometrics
If you lose cash, it is gone. If you lose your checks, you may be liable for
large amounts. But if you lose your credit or debit card in the United States,
you typically are liable only for the first $50 of unauthorized use.12 Credit
and debit cards thus already have a security advantage, which is likely to
grow in the future. Credit and debit cards may soon include biometric and
other new security measures that will further reduce the risk that someone
else will use an individual’s card. These measures will also link individuals
to their purchases in ways that will be difficult or impossible to deny.13
4. Good Audit Trails
For centuries, businesses have known the importance of having a good
audit trail. Keeping close track of expenditures helps keep employees honest
and eases a multitude of business tasks, including payment of taxes,
compliance with internal policies, and planning for optimal expenditures.
These advantages of a good audit trail have begun to spread to individuals
and families, through financial software such as Quicken. Using cash or
checks with such software requires laborious rekeying of the transactions. By
contrast, electronic payment information can flow directly into the family
database, automatically tracking business deductions, taxable contributions,
and other useful categories. Personal financial software will undoubtedly
improve over time, creating value-added for consumers as they make
payments electronically.14 Although audit trail systems can in theory be
anonymous borrowers, the risks associated with key management of anonymous accounts, and other
market acceptance problems for strongly anonymous transactions).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (1994). For an analysis of the different legal rules for
unauthorized use of checks, debit cards, and credit cards, see Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards,
and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181 (1996).
13. See John D. Woodward, Jr., Biometrics and the Future of Money, ELEC. BANKING L. &
COMMERCE REP., June 1998, at 1. Woodward argues that biometrics generally will increase security
and customer privacy. He admits, however, that the “potential for a breach in database security
increases greatly as shortcuts are taken, budgets are slashed, trained personnel are few and leaders do
not draft and implement plans to safeguard biometric identification information for which they are
responsible.” Id. at 7. Nothing in Woodward’s argument makes these troublesome scenarios seem
unlikely.
14. As an example of value-added, consider a patent awarded to Sun Microsystems in 1998,
which provides various mechanisms for delivering electronic receipts to an e-mail address, a smart
card, or a credit card issuer. See Debra Freeman, Selected Intellectual Property Law Developments,
ELEC. BANKING L. & COMMERCE REP., June 1998, at 19, 21. These electronic receipts might feed
automatically into an individual’s personal financial software, providing documentation of the
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designed to protect the purchaser’s anonymity, it is far from clear that
widely-adopted systems will do so.
5. Electronic Government Benefits
Affinity programs, biometrics, good audit trails, and Internet purchases
may have their greatest effects on the well-off and cyber-savvy. The
payments of lower-income Americans will become more traceable for a
different reason—the spread of electronic government benefits. Many public-
assistance beneficiaries have historically cashed their government checks and
paid for everything in cash, leaving little record of individual purchases. New
laws will lead to more traceable transactions. For example, the 1996 Debt
Collection Improvement Act created a general requirement that after January
1, 1999 Federal Government payments be made by electronic funds
transfer.15 The 1996 welfare reform law required states to convert food
stamps from paper coupons to an all-electronic system by 2002.16
Advantages of electronic payments include lower costs to government,
inclusion of lower-income individuals in the mainstream financial system,
and likely reduction in fraud. The desire to control fraud, however, may
create strong political pressures to have detailed audit trails of beneficiaries’
purchases, creating threats to the individuals’ privacy.17
C. An Anatomy of Harms from Highly Traceable Transactions
The discussion thus far has explained reasons to expect the financial
transactions of many individuals to become more traceable. As people use
cash and checks less, and electronic transactions more, databases will
accumulate information linking the payor, payee, and items sold. In an
increasingly networked world, the existence of such databases can easily
mean that data will spread from one node to another.
If all of an individual’s financial transactions can be traced and are
accessible by others, one can envision many possible harms. This Article will
not reproduce the large literature showing harms that can arise from
expenditures listed in the person’s database.
15. See 31 U.S.C. § 3332(f)(1) (Supp. II 1996). The Secretary of the Treasury retains discretion
to waive application of that requirement for individuals or classes of individuals for whom compliance
imposes a hardship or in other circumstances as may be necessary. See id. § 3332(f)(2).
16. See 7 U.S.C. § 2016(i) (Supp. III 1997).
17. See infra Part IV. For one government study recommending widespread use of electronic
fingerprint identification as a condition for receipt of government benefits, see U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, USE OF BIOMETRICS TO DETER FRAUD IN THE NATIONWIDE EBT PROGRAM
(1995).
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invasions of privacy.18 As an introduction to the importance of financial
privacy, however, this Article will discuss three examples of invasions of
financial privacy: identity theft; the risks posed by having records for every
book and web page that an individual reads; and the additional problems
created by an authoritarian or totalitarian regime track all financial purchases.
With these three illustrations in mind, this Article will then construct an
anatomy of harms from surveillance of financial transactions and of high-
tech surveillance more generally.
The first example is identity theft, or the assumption of an individual’s
name for financial gain. As more personal information becomes available
over networks, it becomes easier for criminals to get hold of previously-
private information. For instance, public birth records (now available from
database companies) often reveal a mother’s maiden name. State drivers
license records, available for law enforcement and marketing purposes, often
reveal an individual’s Social Security Number. Armed with this information,
a criminal can impersonate an individual, get a credit card, and run up large
bills under the stolen name. Trans Union, a major credit bureau, reported
350,000 cases of identity fraud in 1997.19 In the same year, at least 10,000
people were arrested for participating in organized identity theft rings.20
According to the Secret Service, losses from identity theft soared from about
$440 million in 1995 to more than $740 million in 1997.21 As financial
records become more traceable by more people, criminals have greater
opportunities to access the records and use them to impersonate innocent
victims.
A second problem to consider is government and private-sector access to
each book and web page that an individual has accessed. A good deal of
public concern accompanied special prosecutor Kenneth Starr’s subpoena of
the bookstore records of Monica Lewinsky’s purchases.22 To many
observers, this subpoena seemed to be a worse invasion of privacy than a
18. Perhaps the single best account is in the first three chapters of Privacy and Freedom. ALAN
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). Westin identifies the four basic states of individual privacy
as solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve. See id. at 31-32. Of these, anonymity, or “freedom from
identification and surveillance,” is most centrally relevant to financial privacy. Id. at 31. Westin’s
broader discussion of the importance of privacy, however, suggests the many social functions of
protecting privacy and the many sorts of harms that can result, even for those who comply with laws,
if surveillance becomes routine and the area of private space shrinks. See id.
19. See Jan M. Faust, Identity Crisis: When Someone Else Becomes You (visited May 16, 1999)
<http://www.abc.com/sections/us/ DailyNews/id_theft981006.html>.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., In Praise of Susan McDougal, PRIVACY J., Apr. 1998, at
5-6 (arguing that the bookstore that turned over records of Monica Lewinsky’s book purchases could
have defied Prosecutor Starr’s subpoena on First Amendment grounds). See id.
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subpoena of other sorts of financial records. The concerns are likely linked to
what Professor Julie Cohen has called “the right to read anonymously,” the
idea that surveillance of reading threatens First Amendment and related free
speech values.23
That right to read anonymously becomes even more threatened if records
are kept for every web site that a user visits. As web browsing becomes a
more pervasive aspect of daily life, records of each page visited may provide
a startlingly detailed profile of an individual’s interests and activities.
Depending on how individual users configure their web browsers, personal
computers already keep extensive records of what web sites have been
visited. Users today have the ability to tell their browser not to retain these
sorts of history files.24 By contrast, users in the future may have less choice
about whether to leave traces of their web browsing. Some sites today charge
to download desirable content. For instance, USA Today allows free access
to same-day articles. Articles from the archive, however, cost $1.00 each,
payable by credit card.25 In coming years, as “micropayment” systems
develop that can charge pennies or fractions of pennies per page, such pay-
for-content services may become far more common.26 Unless privacy
protections are built in, these payment systems may be fully traceable,
allowing after-the-fact access to each web page visited.
The third problem, perhaps even more troubling, is how an authoritarian
or totalitarian government might use and abuse information about citizens’
financial transactions. Payment technologies developed in the United States
are likely to spread to many countries around the world. Some of those
23. Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management”
in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003-38 (1996). In considering any such right to read
anonymously, there are two distinct inquiries. The first is whether courts will accept such a right as a
matter of constitutional law. See id. at 1003-19. Even if the Constitution does not require such a right,
the second inquiry is whether it is good policy for the right to be recognized by statutory or other law.
See id. at 989-94. Many people, even among those who believe that the Constitution does not provide
an enforceable right to read anonymously, recognize that values underlying the First Amendment and
the theory of free expression make it especially worrisome for governments to be able to track every
item read by citizens.
24. See Carole Lane, Going Private: How to Protect Yourself from Hackers, Snoops, and
Spammers, PC WORLD, Sept. 1, 1998, at 115.
Web browsers do a great job of helping you return to frequently visited sites by keeping a running
list of where you’ve been. Unfortunately, anyone who has access to your system—your boss, your
family, the janitor—can scrutinize which Web sites you’ve been favoring by cruising through
your browser’s history list. If you don’t want anyone else to know where you’ve been and what
you’ve seen, you need to clean up after yourself. But it’s not easy.
Id. at 118-23.
25. See USA Today (visited Mar. 20, 1999) <http://www.usatoday.com>.
26. See A. Michel Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity,
Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COMM. 395 (1996).
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countries lack the democratic history and judicial oversight that exist in the
United States. Dictators and other officials in these countries might be able to
track the financial transactions of ordinary citizens and political opponents.
Surveillance technology that we might find acceptable in the United States,
due to a well-functioning system of checks and balances, may be
unacceptable in other countries.
These examples suggest the range of problems that can result from the
tracking of financial transactions: security breaches due to widespread
availability of personal information (identity theft); threats to free speech and
other values when a wider scope of activities are traced by new technology
(web browsing); and the increasing severity of problems when judicial and
political checks on surveillance are eroded (police state). The discussion in
Part IV will describe other disadvantages that can arise from tracking of
financial transactions.
For each of these problems, one can identify four types of costs from
surveillance: (1) the harms themselves, such as losses caused by theft,
revelation of embarrassing information, or persecution by a corrupt regime;
(2) chilling effects, or activities foregone due to surveillance; (3) cloaking
costs, or actions taken to evade surveillance; and (4) burdens of having to
comply with surveillance requests. The focus here is on the burdens that arise
from surveillance. Weighing those burdens against the benefits of
surveillance will be discussed later in the Article.
1. The Harms Themselves
The first and most obvious concern is for direct harms resulting from
surveillance. For identity theft, the existence of traceable transactions means
that the criminal can more easily seize personal data and use the information
for fraudulent purposes. Victims may have to pay credit card bills that were
incurred by others.27 Often even more burdensome, victims may undergo
considerable time, expense, and mental distress in disputing such bills and
cleansing personal credit histories.28
Disclosure of web browsing might create any number of harms. People
may look at many things on the Internet that they would not publicly
broadcast. Pedestrian examples include the many people who visit
27. Under U.S. law, a customer’s loss from unauthorized credit card use is typically capped at
fifty dollars. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1996). There are, however, circumstances when
customers may pay for unauthorized charges, such as when they do not notice unauthorized purchases
on their bill or when they find it easier to pay the bill than dispute it.
28. See Michael Higgins, Identity Thieves, J.: LAW. MAG., Oct. 1998, at 42 (discussing losses
caused by identity theft).
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pornography and gambling sites. Gay, lesbian, or bisexual people might have
their sexual orientation revealed. Women who seek information on having an
abortion might be tracked. Visitors to political web sites could be identified.
The web records would show who reads about embarrassing medical
conditions, from impotence to incontinence to any other condition that
people might not wish revealed. For people in business, the pattern of web
reading might be of economic value to competitors—why is so-and-so
reading about that topic? For families, web searches about substance abuse,
psychological problems, or other topics might reveal sensitive information to
neighbors, employers, or public officials.29 Such examples could be
multiplied.
In debates about privacy and surveillance, those favoring disclosure
sometimes suggest piously that only criminals or others with something
serious to hide should care about privacy. In this list of possible harms from
disclosure of web browsing, all of the activities revealed are legal. Law-
abiding people can suffer real harms from disclosure of personal information.
The harms from surveillance of all financial transactions are even easier
to imagine in a police state. In the absence of effective checks on official
power, those in control might use the information for their economic or
political advantage. Political opponents, disfavored minorities, and powerless
people generally could be targeted for exploitation by government officials.30
2. Chilling Effects
If I know that I am under surveillance, I might be able to prevent the sorts
of harms just discussed. A chief way to do so would be to restrict my
activities, so that nothing embarrassing or otherwise harmful could be
detected. This “chilling” effect on activities is one of the most widespread
results of surveillance. As discussed in Part III below, the chilling or
deterrence effect reduces crime and other antisocial behavior, and is thus a
major justification for creating surveillance systems and limiting privacy.
This section suggests how surveillance can also chill or deter desirable
behavior.
In looking to the above three examples, a high risk of identity fraud
would tend to chill activities that result in identity fraud or are perceived to
29. For a somewhat similar set of examples, on which this list is loosely based, see ANN
CAVOUKIAN & DON TAPSCOTT, WHO KNOWS: SAFEGUARDING YOUR PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED
WORLD 13-14 (1997).
30. The harms potentially caused by powerful officials are discussed in greater detail below. See
infra Part IV.A.
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result in identity fraud. For instance, consumers who are concerned about the
safety of transmitting their credit card numbers over the Internet will tend to
avoid Internet purchases. More generally, concerns about identity theft might
prompt individuals to use less traceable means of payment, such as cash,
even when they would otherwise prefer to use credit cards or other more
traceable means of payment.
The chilling effects could be widespread and significant if government
gained the power to track every book and web page read by an individual.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the right to write anonymous
political pamphlets, recognizing the chilling effect on speech if authors must
be identified.31 In the 1997 case striking down the Communications Decency
Act, the Supreme Court appreciated the chilling effect that vague and
overbroad restrictions on pornography would have on free expression on the
Internet.32 And, as mentioned above, Professor Cohen has made important
arguments about how free expression might be chilled by surveillance of
what individuals read.33
The chilling effects of tracking web browsing are not limited to traditional
First Amendment concerns about free expression in writing, speaking, and
reading. Surveillance of financial records and web browsing may chill
activities that have only a modest expressive dimension—medical concerns,
business activities, or hobbies that one might find embarrassing. Such
activities might not win constitutional protection under the First Amendment,
but are nonetheless highly desirable. Faced with the knowledge that every
web search might be tracked, people would have reason to refrain from any
browsing that they would not wish to have generally known. At the limit, the
surveillance may approach that found in the “total institutions” studied by
Erving Goffman, such as a jail or military base, where the knowledge that
one is being constantly watched can change behavior and impose a heavy
psychological burden.34
Turning again to the example of the police state, the chilling effect of
surveillance can be pervasive. In a totalitarian regime the individual does not
feel free to go against the wishes of the state. Personal expression and
freedom of action are chilled by the fear of detection and punishment.
31. See MacIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
32. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
33. See Cohen, supra note 23, at 983-89.
34. See ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS
AND OTHER INMATES (1961).
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3. Cloaking Costs
As surveillance mounts, people may make greater efforts to hide, or
“cloak,” information that they wish to keep private. In the physical world,
people might pull a cloak up to cover their face from an onlooker or a
surveillance camera. Military aircraft use cloaking or stealth technology to
become invisible to radar. As the aircraft example suggests, these cloaking
costs may be substantial.35
One would expect to see similar cloaking costs as recordkeeping and the
possibility of detection increases for financial transactions. To reduce the risk
of identity theft, people might take the trouble to act untraceably by using
cash or pseudonyms. A person scared to use a credit card for a telephone or
Internet purchase might instead take a taxi across town to pay in cash. The
additional time and expense of going across town are “cloaking” costs. As an
example of using a pseudonym, people might do business through wholly-
owned corporations rather than in their own names. Expenses of creating the
corporation, and acting through it in ways that are difficult to trace, are
cloaking costs. It is rational to incur cloaking costs up to the point where the
expected benefit of the cloaking exceeds the expected cost from identity theft
or other harm.
Similar cloaking costs might be incurred to avoid leaving traces of web
browsing. For instance, people might do potentially embarrassing browsing
from a public terminal, in a library or cafe, rather than from their own
computer. The public terminal acts much like the traditional pay telephone,
which can be used to make untraceable calls. Embarrassing browsing might
also be done using a borrowed, stolen, or otherwise untraceable Internet
account. These sorts of countermeasures may evade surveillance, but they
impose cloaking costs on those who do not wish to have their activities
observed.
The motivation for cloaking is particularly easy to understand in a police
state. Where the individual mistrusts the state and the state has broad
surveillance powers, the individual may take extraordinary measures to hide
economic or other activity.
4. Burden of Complying with Surveillance
Even when an individual’s other activities are not affected, complying
35. The cost of each B-2 stealth bomber, for instance, is about $2 billion. See Steven Komarow,
Desert Thunder Plan of Attack: Waging War Was Simpler, Victory More Clear Cut, USA TODAY,
Feb. 13, 1998, at 1A.
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with a surveillance system can impose burdens. Consider the growing
practice of requiring fingerprints from those who wish to cash a check at a
bank. There may be minimal risk of harm to the individual from providing a
fingerprint, in the sense that good protections may be in place against anyone
stealing the fingerprint. The chilling effect, on those who will cash checks
anyway, may be small. As for cloaking effects, presumably few people will
try to fraudulently reproduce another’s fingerprints. Nonetheless, even if
these types of harms are nonexistent, and even if the process is quick and
clean, some individuals will experience the fingerprinting as burdensome.
Some people will feel a sense of personal invasion, of stigma, at being
printed like a criminal. Others may be saddened by the loss of trust or
community in society that the fingerprinting represents. Still others might
worry about what will be done with the fingerprints, even if good measures
are in place to prevent misuse.
Returning to the three examples, new burdens may result from the
growing incidence of identity theft. Over time, because mothers’ maiden
names and Social Security Numbers are becoming less secure, society will
have to develop new methods for establishing identity.36 These new methods
may make the mechanics of a transaction more burdensome. Some methods
of secure digital signatures, for instance, make an Internet transaction take
substantially longer than the current, and less secure, use of credit card
numbers.37 The new methods may also require use of fingerprints or other
biometric techniques to establish identity. As with use of fingerprints in
cashing a check, some people will feel an invasion of privacy and loss of
autonomy from having to participate in such a system.
In the case of web browsing, the burden of complying with surveillance
may be small or nonexistent. Indeed, tracking a person’s web purchases may
be automatic and unobserved by the user, just as collection of “cookie”
information often is today.38 On the other hand, the burdens may be
significant. There may be web sites, which a user very much wants to use,
36. A mother’s maiden name often appears on a person’s birth record as the middle name of the
mother. Because birth records are generally treated as public records in the United States, and public
records are increasingly available from on-line companies, it is often possible to learn a mother’s
maiden name. As for Social Security Numbers, many states use SSNs in their drivers’ records, and
these records are often available to direct marketing and other companies.
37. See John D. Muller, Selected Developments in the Law of Cyberspace Payments, 54 BUS.
LAW. 403, 407-08 (1998).
38. Cookie technology allows a web site to place bits of code, or “cookies,” on a user’s hard
drive. The code permits tracking of information about where a user goes on the web site itself, as well
other information about the user’s operating system and browsing activities. For steps users can take to
counteract cookies, see Anti-Cookie Measures (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.junkbusters.com/
links.html#measures>.
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that condition access to the site on the supplying of detailed personal
information.39 It is also possible that users in the future will need to get the
equivalent of drivers’ licenses in order to browse on the Information
Superhighway.40 If these licensing procedures become widely-used, there
will be the burden of applying for such licenses, as well as the perception of a
burden from having one’s movements tracked.41
The burden of complying with surveillance is especially easy to see in a
police state. In the physical world, there is the oppressive need to hand over
one’s papers at every police checkpoint. For financial transactions, the state
might require forms to be filled out or other actions to be taken that
constantly remind individuals of the presence of surveillance.
II. WHERE DOES THE DATA GO—THE VAULT 600 FEET DOWN
Part I of this Article explained the reasons for believing that financial
transactions will be increasingly traceable over time. It also began to explore
why such traceability may be a problem. Significant harms can result from
security breaches (identity theft), from the way that disclosure of financial
records can threaten free speech and other values (web browsing), and from
the power that control over information can give to authoritarian and
totalitarian regimes (police state). Part I also provided an anatomy of harms
from invasions of financial privacy and from surveillance more generally: the
harms themselves; the chilling effects, or actions foresaken due to
surveillance; the cloaking effects, or actions taken to evade surveillance; and
the transaction costs and emotional burdens of complying with a surveillance
system.
39. For some sites, the user may not feel there is really any choice whether to use the site. For
instance, an employer might condition payment of benefits on providing information via its site, and a
monopoly public utility might condition service on receiving information via its site. For other sites,
the user might perceive a net gain from going to the desirable site but may nonetheless begrudge the
need to provide information. In economic terms, the consumer surplus from the transaction is still
positive but is reduced by the burden of complying with the requests for information.
40. For an interesting novel that makes the requirements of such licenses an important theme, see
MELISSA SCOTT, TROUBLE AND HER FRIENDS (1994). The novel also employs the helpful term
“syscops” to refer to the “system cops” who are responsible for ensuring that their computer systems
are in compliance with legal rules. See id. at 56-65 (explaining one such investigation by these
syscops).
41. For a contrast of the desirability of such licensing approaches for access to adult content to
approaches based on the use of filters, see Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, The Architectures of
Mandated Access Controls (Sept. 8, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, available at
<http://www.si.umich.edu/~presnick/papers/lessig98/> (visited June 20, 1999)). If web purchases rely
on the use of certificate authorities to authenticate the purchaser’s identity, then there will be a similar
burden for purchasers to apply for the certificates. See Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of
Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REV. 49 (1996).
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All of these harms, and others discussed below in Part IV, may result
from increased traceability of financial transactions. In considering financial
privacy, however, harm to individuals depends crucially on how the data are
used and misused; harm does not depend on the mere existence of data. As a
logical matter, the creation of a database does not mean that damage will be
done to individuals’ privacy. Damage may result as data emerge from the
database and are used in particular ways.
A. The Vault 600 Feet Down
A thought experiment makes this point easier to grasp. Imagine that all of
the data about an individual’s transactions flow into a database. The database
is in a super-strong vault 600 feet beneath the Earth’s surface. By the terms
of the thought experiment, data can flow into the vault but cannot flow out.42
Once the database is created, the data simply sit there until the end of time. If
the vault is truly tamper-proof, then no harm to privacy will result from leaks
of the data.43
In real life, of course, there is no such foolproof vault 600 feet down.
Even if such a vault were proposed, for instance, worries might exist about
whether those who constructed the vault had built a “back door” into its
hardware or software, allowing later entry by the workers or their associates.
Nonetheless, a surprisingly good simulation of the vault might exist in the
form of the data centers operated by some of the largest credit card issuers.
These data centers, sometimes operated in remote locations, have high fences
and other strong physical security. They have (or should have) security
specialists who guard against unauthorized access to data by both employees
and outsiders. And they have (or should have) substantial computer staffs to
assist the specialists provide virtual security against crackers.
B. Why the Vault Metaphor Is Useful
The image of a vault 600 feet down (or the real-life data centers) helps
42. It is intriguing to think about how to make the vault truly tamper-proof. The vault might, for
example, explode if anyone ever tried to enter it. For one science fiction account of an apparently
foolproof vault, see DAN SIMMON, ENDYMION (1996).
43. At least two further assumptions would be necessary to assure no harm to privacy interests.
First, transfers of data into the vault must be secure. That is, the data must travel from the transaction
to the vault without interception by outside parties. Second, individuals must perceive the vault and
transfers to the vault as secure. If individuals mistakenly believe that the data will be used in harmful
ways, then their participation in the transactional system might be chilled. In such circumstances,
worries about privacy would prevent individuals from entering into transactions they otherwise would
have chosen.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/6
p461 Swire.doc 07/27/99  10:58 AM
1999] THE THEORY OF HIGH-TECH GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 479
focus our attention on exactly how financial data might escape out to the
surface of the world. We can imagine each use of data as a pipeline going
from the vault to the surface. Some pipelines might lead only to other highly
secure locations, where the data will be used for admirable reasons. Suppose,
for instance, that the financial data only would be used to catch high-level,
dangerous criminals. In such circumstances, most people would agree that
the benefits of having the pipeline outweigh the risks to privacy. Other
pipelines, however, might create large and unjustified risks to privacy.
Suppose, for instance, that the pipeline led to a site that automatically posted
all of the transaction records of individuals onto the web. In such
circumstances, a similar majority would conclude that the risks to privacy
outweighed the benefits of having the pipeline.
The vault metaphor focuses attention on whether it is desirable to allow
the intended recipients to have the data. What are the legitimate uses of data
by that category of recipients? What risks, to privacy or otherwise,
accompany each of these uses? Focusing first on the use of data by the
intended recipients themselves, we can ask whether this sort of pipeline is
worth constructing.
The metaphor also helps us visualize an analytically distinct problem—
access to data by unauthorized third parties (“UTPs”).44 The metaphor helps
show two different ways that UTPs might get the data. First, the pipelines to
the surface might be tapped by malicious third parties. If there are many
pipelines (many withdrawals of data from the vault), then hackers will have
many targets for grabbing data en route to the intended recipients.
Fortunately, good encryption and other security practices can often make this
risk manageable. Second, and more importantly, the data may not be secure
once they reach the intended recipients on the surface. Previously, the data
were housed in an impregnable vault 600 feet down; now they might be
sitting in a “flimsy shack” on the surface. The data transported out of the
vault will only be as secure as the flimsiest of these shacks. The risk to
privacy is especially great in our modern age when each computer that
receives data from the vault can generally make instant and multiple copies
of that data and disseminate the data widely over networks. If a burglar enters
one flimsy shack, the burglar can copy and spread all the data accessible
from the shack’s computer.
One caveat is needed about the metaphor of the single enormous vault,
600 feet down. Everyone knows that there has been a change over the past
44. The first two parties are the individual data subject and the organization operating the vault.
The intended recipients are authorized third parties. Hackers and others who get the data are
unauthorized third parties.
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few decades in computer technology, from a centralized pattern of a few
mainframe computers to the distributed processing model of today’s
Internet.45 This shift to distributed processing might seem to contradict the
metaphor of a single vault. I suggest, however, that the vault image is
nonetheless highly useful. Credit and debit card transactional data are likely
to flow into one or a few major data centers, often operated by or on behalf
of the card issuer. Instead of one vault holding the data, there might be a few
with records of a particular transaction. The key question still arises,
however, about what pipelines should emerge from any given vault—who
should be able to access the data? Many of the other important categories of
surveillance data are similarly likely to be collected in a small number of data
centers: tax returns with the IRS, records of telephone calls with large
telephone companies, and records of the location of a cellular phone with
large telephone companies. In some instances, subsets of these records will
exist in other data centers, such as when a merchant can link some customers
to their credit card numbers. These other databases, however, will not be
nearly as comprehensive as those in the major data centers, and will
consequently be less useful to government surveillance. For analytic
purposes, we can discuss what rules are appropriate for the government
receiving data from one vault. As discussed below, the risks to privacy will
be higher to the extent data is housed in multiple vaults. Anonymity will then
be a more compelling option.
C. Who Gets the Data, Good Procedures, and the Anonymity Option
A complete analysis of financial privacy requires careful attention to how
types of data flow into and out of the vault. Some of the pipelines out of the
vault will be to governments. Such uses of data help law enforcement, but
may also lead to a range of undesirable uses of government power. Part III of
this Article sets forth the arguments for government access to financial data.
Part IV similarly examines the arguments for limiting such government
access.
Some of the pipelines out of the vault flow to authorized users in the
private sector. Credit card companies, for instance, might use the data as part
of a fraud protection program46 or might release the data, when legal, to
45. An entire chapter of my recent book explores the implications for privacy regulation of the
shift from centralized mainframe processing to distributed processing over a network. See SWIRE &
LITAN, supra note 1, at 50-75.
46. For example, a few years ago Citibank ran a series of television ads touting its fraud
protection program, which contacted the customer for verification when a “jeans sort of guy” got
married and started to charge champagne and other luxuries to his credit card. In this example, the data
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affiliates for marketing purposes. Such private-sector use of data is the “data
protection” issue that is the primary subject of the European Union Directive
on Data Protection, which took effect in October 1998.47
Finally, some of the pipelines out of the vault might flow directly to
unauthorized third parties, who may have found a vulnerability in the vault’s
defenses. More likely, however, these unauthorized third parties will tap into
other pipelines or will grab the data from authorized recipients. Recently
proposed legislation would address this problem in part by making it a
federal crime to use false pretenses to gain someone’s financial
information.48
In considering all of the possible government, private-sector, and
unauthorized uses of financial data, one sees how far we have traveled from
the initial thought experiment. Originally, the data were locked securely and
permanently in an inaccessible vault. Now, the image shifts to that of the
New York City water system—untold thousands of miles of pipes leading in
every direction, with large and unstoppable leaks bursting out in innumerable
places. The reality of financial data flows, I hope and believe, is much more
watertight than New York’s aging water system. The analysis below of uses
of financial data is intended to help understand where and how leaks or other
misuses of data are most likely to occur.
There are two main policy responses as data flow out of the vault and into
this potentially leaky system. The first is to create good procedures. Good
rules and operating practices would limit when data leave the vault and
assure the security of data that do go to the surface. When good procedures
are not available, the second response is to prevent data from entering the
vault in the first place. For transactions where the privacy risks outweigh the
advantages of data flows, that means allowing or encouraging the option of
anonymity.
1. Procedures for Protecting Data Leaving the Vault
One general method for controlling leaks is to institute strict procedures
whenever data leave the vault. In the United States, the rules concerning
these procedures are usually called “privacy” or “data privacy” laws, while
Europeans more often refer to them as “data protection” laws. In Europe,
national laws seek to control use of data in government and the private
sector, and the European Union Data Protection Directive creates
on past purchases created an alert when the pattern of purchases changed.
47. See SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 1, at 102-21.
48. See H.R. 4321, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); S. 2433, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998).
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harmonized rules for mainly private-sector processing of personal
information.49 In the United States, the Privacy Act of 1974 sets somewhat
similar rules for how the Federal Government can handle data about
citizens.50
Under the U.S. Constitution, one might suppose that bank records would
be accorded some protection under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. As discussed in this Article,
unlimited access to financial records could lead to abuses of governmental
power, of the sort historically targeted by the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Court, however, has thus far rejected constitutional claims to the
privacy of financial records held by banks. In the leading case of United
States v. Miller,51 a bank customer claimed a Fourth Amendment interest in
microfilm records of checks, deposit slips, and other records relating to his
accounts at two banks.52 The customer claimed that these records were
within his expectation of privacy and should not be provided to the
government in a criminal enforcement action.53 The Supreme Court denied
the customer’s claims, holding that the materials were the business records of
the banks, and not the customer’s private papers.54 Essentially, the individual
had waived any expectation of privacy by voluntarily doing business with the
bank in a manner that would reveal his financial activities to bank
personnel.55
Where privacy rights are not recognized as a matter of constitutional law,
Congress or state legislatures can create such rights by statute. In the wake of
Miller, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
(“RFPA”), which protects customer records maintained by certain financial
institutions from improper disclosure to officials or agencies of the Federal
Government.56 Disclosures may be made only where authorized, such as
through written customer authorization, subpoenas, search warrants, and
formal written requests.57 With narrow exceptions, customers must be
notified in advance before the financial institution releases their records, and
49. For a discussion of the Data Protection Directive, see generally SWIRE & LITAN, supra note
1, at 28-33.
50. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
51. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
52. See id. at 437-39.
53. See id. at 442.
54. See id. at 442-43.
55. See id. at 443.
56. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994). For a detailed treatment, see 1 L. RICHARD FISCHER,
THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY ¶¶ 2.01-2.10, at 2-1 to 2-130 (3d ed. 1998).
57. See 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1994).
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the customer is given an opportunity to object to release.58
The RFPA suggests both the potential and limitations of the statutory
approach to privacy protection. The potential is that the RFPA establishes
fairly detailed procedures before federal officials can gain access to bank
records. In this respect, the RFPA is similar to other statutes that create
procedures governing Federal Government access to wiretaps and other
defined electronic communications,59 cable television records,60 and video
tape rental or sale records.61
The limitations of the statutory approach are suggested, first, by the rather
short list of circumstances where procedures are required before data about
individuals, in the hands of other parties such as businesses, can be supplied
to the Federal Government. Under the RFPA itself, moreover, only the
Federal Government must follow the procedures, including notice to the
customer, before seeing the records. State and local governments are exempt
from the requirements of the Act, (unless a separate state law exists) as are
private organizations.62 The Act has also been read to have other exceptions,
such as where an Internal Revenue Service summons was held valid despite
its noncompliance with the requirements of the Act.63 Furthermore, even
where statutes require good procedures, there is the additional empirical
question of the extent to which the government follows the procedures. Many
Americans would hope and believe that government officials in the United
States follow legal requirements before obtaining records. In some other
countries, however, there would be heightened concerns about whether
officials are scrupulous, even where legal restrictions on access exist.
2. The Anonymity Option
At least as a matter of theory, good procedures created by statute can be a
sufficient answer to concerns about government access to personal financial
information. One can imagine a well-crafted set of laws and regulations that
calibrate the level of required procedure to the privacy risk in each setting. In
58. See id. § 3409. Along with other requirements, delayed notice is permitted only if
there is reason to believe that notice will result in—(A) endangering life or physical safety of any
person; (B) flight from prosecution; (C) destruction of or tampering with evidence; (D)
intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or
official proceeding or unduly delaying a trial or ongoing official proceeding.
Id. § 3409(a)(3).
59. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
60. See 47 U.S.C. § 551(h) (1994).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2) (1994).
62. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401(3), 3402 (1994).
63. See, e.g., United States v. MacKay, 608 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1979).
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the real world, however, such a well-crafted system might not exist. The
privacy-protective laws might not be enacted; if enacted, they might not be
followed by officials.
The next question, then, is what should be done when the pipeline system
leaving the vault is fatally flawed, when the privacy and other disadvantages
of having data leave the vault outweigh the advantages of sending the data up
the pipelines. The answer, in such circumstances, can be to prevent the data
from entering the vault in the first place. When there are inadequate controls
on data that leave the vault, then one might have filters on flows into the
vault.
For transactions with high privacy risks, that means allowing the option
of anonymity. As a start, we might design systems that minimize the number
of parties who can access the data before it flows into a secured vault. For
example, one problem with credit card transactions today is that the
merchants and the merchants’ banks see the credit card number of the
purchaser. A waiter in the restaurant or a web site operator can copy down
the account number and use it in unauthorized ways. One way to reduce this
problem is to implement the SET or other new credit card protocols that hide
the account number from the merchant and the merchant’s bank. In such
systems, the transaction can be traced only by the individual buyer and the
buyer’s bank. In this way, the buyer’s account number is filtered out of the
merchants’ databases, reducing the risk to security and privacy.
More thorough anonymity is also possible. Internet payment systems are
technically feasible that would have the purchaser’s bank also be unable to
link the transaction to the individual purchaser.64 In some of these systems,
the purchaser’s identity would indeed become known to the purchaser’s
bank, but only in specified circumstances, such as where the purchaser
defaulted on a payment.65 With the development of new payment systems
and other new technologies, system designers and policymakers have many
choices on the spectrum between complete traceability and complete
anonymity.66
In concluding the discussion of the vault, it is now easier to see the
fundamental choices for structuring flows of personal information.
Information can be filtered out before it reaches the vault. In such cases, as in
today’s ordinary cash transactions, there is anonymity in the sense of not
creating a data link between the individual and the transaction. Once the data
64. See Chaum, supra note 10, at 96.
65. See id.
66. See the many thoughtful essays in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE
(Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997).
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enters the vault, it might be left there forever untouched, deep under the
ground. Or the data might flow to the surface through various pipelines.
Legal rules and good operating procedures can provide security for the data
while in the pipeline. Other good rules and procedures can limit who can
access the data once it reaches the surface. For each pipeline, we can assess
the advantages and disadvantages of allowing data to come to the surface.
III. ADVANTAGES OF GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO TRANSACTIONAL
INFORMATION
The vault analogy can be used to visualize the risks and benefits of
information-gathering systems both for financial and for other data, such as
tracking of cellular phones or key escrow of encrypted messages. The
discussion in this Part will examine the advantages of government access to
records of the financial transactions of individuals. Subsequent Parts explore
the disadvantages of such access and the ways the analysis can be
generalized to assess government surveillance in other settings.
The government has a strong interest in receiving data relevant to its own
financial affairs, such as collection of taxes and distribution of benefits. It
also has a strong interest in receiving data to deter, detect, and punish
violations of law. These two interests combine in enforcement against tax
evasion and benefits fraud. Along with this criminal and civil enforcement,
money laundering laws, with their emphasis on “following the money trail,”
turn out to be at the heart of modern government demands to greater access
to financial records. More generally, government access to information holds
out the possibility of efficiency gains, not just for law enforcement, but in the
administration of government more generally.
A. Financial Affairs of the Government Itself
The government receives considerable financial information from
individuals when the government itself is a party to the transaction. Some of
these transactions involve payments to the government, such as taxes. Some
of them involve payments from the government, such as welfare and other
transfers to low-income beneficiaries.
There are compelling reasons for the government to receive accurate
financial information for these transactions. As a general matter, parties to a
transaction often insist on detailed and accurate financial information.
Private-sector mortgage lenders, for instance, typically insist on verifying a
great deal of information about the borrower. For the government, when
collecting taxes, access to financial records helps correct for the sometimes
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overwhelming human temptation not to pay all of the taxes due by law. On
the benefits side, accurate information reduces the likelihood that people will
fraudulently or mistakenly receive benefits for which they are not eligible.
Where the government’s own money is at stake, the case for access to
financial information is easily grasped. Accurate financial information makes
the administration of tax and benefit programs more efficient. Such
information helps uphold the rule of law in government financial
transactions. By treating like cases alike, good information helps achieve
fairness and the perception of fairness. A perception of fairness, in turn,
likely increases citizen compliance with tax and eligibility rules.
These arguments, although powerful, are limited by their rationale. They
explain why the government, much like a private lender or other party,
should have access to the information required for its own financial
transactions. The arguments do not give a reason, however, for the IRS or a
benefits office to share information with agencies that do not need the
information to assist in the government’s financial affairs.
B. Laws to Detect, Deter, and Prove Illegality
A more general reason for government access to financial information is
to assist in enforcement of the laws. There is a long and distinguished history,
for instance, of requiring good records to prevent fraud. The Statute of
Frauds, passed in England in 1677, required that important contracts be
memorialized in writing.67 Under U.S. securities laws, an issuer must provide
detailed written disclosures of all material facts.68 If disputes later arise about
what issuers promised, disgruntled investors can introduce the writings in
court and thereby prevent issuers from changing their story.
Financial records can be extremely useful in detecting a variety of illegal
behavior. For instance, discrepancies in financial records can uncover
embezzlement and other illegal acts. An important role of outside auditors is
to scrutinize the records of transactions in order to uncover such problems.
This possibility of detection, in turn, serves as a deterrent to crime.
Employees are far less likely to steal if they know that internal records,
checked by outside auditors, will leave a record of their criminality long after
the crime is committed. Furthermore, a party can use detailed records in court
67. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19-1, at 774-75
(3d ed. 1987). For example, to enforce contracts for land or for longer than one year, courts ordinarily
required the contracts to be in writing. See id.
68. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994) (creating civil liability for false registration statements); id.
§ 78j (forbidding “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device”).
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after the fact to prove the existence of illegal behavior.
One can therefore see how detailed financial records can further the
central goals of law enforcement, namely, the detection, deterrence, and
proof of illegal activity. The historical pattern has been to permit law
enforcement officials to obtain financial records where they exist, often by
means of a subpoena, warrant, or other legal process. The historical pattern
for certain limited categories of transactions has been to require a writing,
such as for the issuing of securities or for contracts covered by the Statute of
Frauds. Until recently, however, law enforcement officials have not made it a
priority to require that ordinary transactions leave permanent records.
C. Money Laundering Laws and Privacy
The possibility of mandated records becomes far more likely in the
context of modern money laundering laws. According to the U.S. Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), money laundering laws are
essential to the government’s ability to “follow the money trail.” U.S. money
laundering laws today apply to large transactions. A “currency transaction
report” (“CTR”) must be filed with the government for cash transactions over
$10,000.69 Similar forms are required for the import or export of over
$10,000 in currency.70 Related rules prohibit “structuring” smaller
transactions in order to avoid the $10,000 trigger for reporting
requirements.71 Banks and other institutions also must institute various
“know your customer” practices. Notably, existing regulations require banks
to file “suspicious activity reports” for situations such as where the
transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the
sort [of transaction] in which the particular customer would normally
be expected to engage, and the institution knows of no reasonable
explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts,
including the background and possible purpose of the transaction.72
Money laundering rules have been expanded repeatedly in recent years,
69. For an extremely detailed treatment of current money laundering laws, see FISCHER, supra
note 56, ¶¶ 4.01-4.13, at 4-1 to 4-101. For regulations on Currency Transaction Reports, see 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.22 (1998). For discussion of CTR requirements, see FISCHER, supra note 56, ¶ 4.06, at 4-25 to 4-
50.
70. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1994); 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a) (1998).
71. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324. The structuring rules were enacted as part of the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18, as were provisions allowing for the
forfeiture of assets obtained or used by money launderers. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) (1994).
72. 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(4)(iii) (1998). This regulation was promulgated in 1996. See 61 Fed.
Reg. 4337 (1996). A 1998 proposal to expand the “know your customer” rules is discussed below.
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both in the United States and other countries. A seemingly inexorable logic
has underlaid this expansion. The original trigger of a $10,000 cash deposit
created incentives to make deposits of $9,999, leading to passage of the
“structuring” laws. As banks began to keep stricter records, the temptation
grew for criminals to use other institutions, such as casinos, as the preferred
route for laundering cash. The result has been a steady expansion of the range
of institutions covered by the reporting requirements.73
The next horizon for money laundering experts is to assure that similar
rules apply to electronic cash transactions. This view is well expressed by
noted criminal law professor Sarah Welling, who with coauthor Andy
Rickman has recently written an article entitled Cyberlaundering: The Risks,
The Responses.74 The authors have worked extensively with Fincen, and their
central point is clear: “The government must be able to trace transfers of
value to detect and prosecute money laundering.”75 In co nection with the
rise of traceable payments, the authors are explicit: “The government should
require the issuers to design the electronic cash systems to create an audit
trail.”76 That is, the money laundering enforcement community believes that
untraceable electronic transactions should be forbidden. Otherwise,
enforcement officials fear a giant loophole will emerge in the current system
of money laundering laws.
In Welling and Rickman’s detailed article on cyberlaundering, the entire
topic of privacy receives only a single sentence: “Privacy interests of
consumers and merchants often will conflict with the government’s interest
in obtaining information to prevent money laundering.”77 This extremely
brief attention to privacy concerns has been common thus far among those
involved in money laundering enforcement. Based on my own interviews
with U.S. prosecutors and others involved in money laundering enforcement,
there was no substantial intellectual or political pressure until 1999 to explain
how to reconcile privacy concerns with the rapidly-expanding web of money
laundering laws. Until recently, enforcement officials have been supported in
this attitude by the mainstream political community in the United States,
which has viewed money laundering laws as a popular component of the war
73. See FISCHER, supra note 56, ¶¶ 4.02-4.03, at 4-10 to 4-17.
74. Sarah N. Welling & Andy G. Rickman, Cyberlaundering: The Risks, the Responses, 50 FLA.
L. REV. 295 (1998).
75. Id. at 320. The article itself grew out of the authors’ participation in conferences jointly
sponsored by FinCEN and the Rand Corporation. See id. at 295 nn.a1-aa1.
76. As another component of a thorough system of money laundering rules, the authors state that
“the government . . . needs to be able to decrypt these messages when criminal activity is suspected.”
Id. at 322.
77. Id. at 317.
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on drugs, and not as a threat to the privacy interests of ordinary citizens.
As of early 1999, there are important signs that this political calculus is
beginning to change. The first wave of opposition to money laundering
regulation emerged in connection with the U.S. Government’s campaign for
mandatory key escrow for cryptography. Under the “Clipper Chip” and later
proposals, the Government sought to have a key left on file by all users of
cryptography, so that the Government would be able to read the full text of a
message upon a proper showing of sufficient cause.78 In response, supporters
of strong cryptography claimed that the Government was exaggerating the
threat posed by “the Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse”—terrorists,
pedophiles, drug dealers, and money launderers.79 Th  “Four Horsemen”
term ironically lampoons the image of a future Internet dominated by
numerous and dangerous criminals. As used by opponents of government
surveillance, the “Four Horsemen” term invites us to consider whether law
enforcement officials are overstating the criminal potential of the Internet
while understating the usefulness of cryptography and of the Internet to a
host of desirable activities.
The second wave of opposition to money laundering is just emerging. In
December 1998 the Department of the Treasury proposed new “know your
customer” regulations, using language that provoked a privacy alarm:
As proposed, the regulation would require each bank to develop a
program designed to determine the identity of its customers; determine
its customers’ sources of funds; determine the normal and expected
transactions of its customers; monitor account activity for transactions
that are inconsistent with those normal and expected transactions; and
report any transactions of its customers that are determined to be
suspicious, in accordance with the [agency’s] existing suspicious
activity reporting regulation.80
Concerning privacy, the proposed regulation has only a short and bland
statement that does not address the range of privacy concerns expressed in
this Article.81 In immediate response to the proposal, press accounts appeared
78. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Courts,
and the Constitution, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 709 (1995).
79. See, e.g., Keith Dawson, Trolling Arms for a Horseman (last modified Mar. 21, 1997)
<http://www.tbtf.com/aresource/horseman-arms.html> (discussing Four Horsemen of the Inf calypse).
80. Know Your Customer Requirements, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,524 (1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 21).
81.
The proposed regulation requires banks to gather information about customers that, if misused,
could result in an invasion of a customer’s privacy. Accordingly, it is the [agency’s] expectation
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describing the rule as “an Orwellian intrusion into Americans’ privacy.”82
Opposition arose from an “alliance of conservative, libertarian, and privacy
groups.”83 (Less than three weeks after the regulation was proposed, the
number of public comments to the FDIC topped 6,000, eclipsing the previous
all-time record of fewer than 3,500.84)
In considering the proposed expansion of money laundering laws, it is
important to confront the extent to which such laws directly affect the sorts of
privacy concerns explored in this Article. The proposed “Know Your
Customer” rules vividly raise the question of the extent to which
governments should enlist banks in the surveillance of private financial
transactions. The proposed expansion of money laundering laws to
cyberspace, along the lines contemplated by Welling and Rickman, could
have an unprecedented effect of prohibiting cash transactions by ordinary
individuals for ordinary purchases. The sharp political response to the “Know
Your Customer” proposal suggests the unease felt in different parts of the
political spectrum at the idea of the government requiring new levels of
financial surveillance.
The next task is how to integrate law enforcement concerns with privacy
concerns. This is no easy task. To begin with, law enforcement officials are
emphatically correct that the “Four Horsemen” and other criminals might use
the Internet in dangerous ways. For example, the insightful novel Numbered
Account, by former Swiss banker Christopher Reich, tells a provocative story
of how money laundering might be used to further both drug smuggling and
international terrorist activities.85 While recognizing the risks that the Internet
can and will be used in some circumstances by criminals, I believe that the
political debate to date has placed too much emphasis on the Four Horsemen
that, in complying [sic] the Know Your Customer regulation, a bank will obtain only that
information that is necessary to comply with the regulation and will limit the use of this
information to complying with the regulation. Financial institutions need to safeguard and handle
responsibly the information gathered in connection with complying with these obligations, and
should integrate comprehensive privacy practices into their Know Your Customer programs.
Id. at 67,525.
82. Declan McCullagh, Banking with Big Brother (last modified Dec. 10, 1998)
<http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/16749.html>.
83. Id. Groups expressing opposition included the Free Congress Foundation, a conservative
group, the American Civil Liberties Union, the quintessential libertarian organization, and the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, often identified as a liberal, or at least proregulatory, group on
many privacy issues. Strong opposition was also expressed by Republican Congressman Ron Paul of
Texas, a member of the House Banking Committee. Id.
84. See Gabrielle Stevenson, Record Response to “Know Your Customer”: FDIC Receives More
Than 6,000 Comments (last modified Dec. 23, 1998) <http//www.worldnetdaily.com/bluesky_exnews/
19981223_xex_record_respo.shtml>. The overwhelming majority of the public comments opposed the
proposed regulation. See id.
85. CHRISTOPHER REICH, NUMBERED ACCOUNT (1998).
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and other asserted risks.
Over time, perhaps, greater experience with the Internet will allow the
political debate to take greater account of the following three points. First,
evils such as drug smuggling, tax evasion, and terrorism have historically
existed without the Internet. Cocaine and other illegal drug sales in the
United States soared in the pre-Internet era. Second, whether the Internet
increases or decreases the level of such evils is a complex empirical question,
with no general answer. On the one hand, law enforcement fears that
encryption will reduce detection of criminal activity. On the other hand, the
Internet creates innumerable new flows of information, which may lead to a
higher level of detection of criminal activity. Even if strong cryptography is
available, criminals may not use it effectively or may have codes
compromised (as in traditional law enforcement) by insiders who cooperate
with the authorities. Criminals may also rely on the apparent security of
cryptography to leave far more extensive records than would otherwise exist.
If so, when such caches are revealed, then the net effect of cryptography may
be to facilitate convictions.
Third, sustained and careful attention should be given to the benefits of
cryptography and of other Internet activities and to the risks of new
surveillance powers. Law enforcement officials, in light of their institutional
responsibilities, have an obligation to explain the risks of criminal activity
that can result from new technologies. The entire political process, however,
should make the ultimate decision about how these risks of criminal behavior
weigh against the benefits from the new technology and the risks created by
new surveillance powers.
In the money laundering area, the argument for allowing anonymity and
privacy is especially compelling for small denomination purchases that often
reveal detailed and potentially embarrassing information about individuals.86
The argument for government access to data becomes more compelling for
large-denomination transactions, where concerns about money laundering
and tax evasion are more salient. The technical problem at the core of the
eventual financial privacy regime is whether we can create rules and
institutions that approximate the status quo, with routine daily purchases
often made in an untraced or secure way but with large transactions generally
traceable. The key challenge for system designers, in a computerized setting,
is to facilitate anonymous small transactions without creating a loophole that
allows criminals or others to aggregate many anonymous small transactions
86. Welling and Rickman agree that policymakers should explore the possibility of creating a
payment system where small-denomination purchases would not be traced on a mandatory basis. See
Welling & Rickman, supra note 74, at 319.
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into a large total. In electronic payments, as in realspace payments, some
illicit transactions will occur. But mandatory government surveillance should
only exist where its actual advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
D. Efficiency vs. Privacy?
In discussing the advantages of allowing flows of financial data to
government, the focus has been on preventing or prosecuting illegal
behavior. Greater information flows can restrict money laundering, help track
deadbeat parents who fail to pay child support, and otherwise reduce the
harms to society that inefficient surveillance permits. An even more general
rationale, however, often exists for providing information to the
government—efficiency. Free flows of information, in both the public and
private sector, can lead to a variety of efficiency gains. Think, for example,
of the burden of filling out government paperwork. Suppose that in an
electronic future an individual would never have to provide information more
than once to any government. In this technocratic utopia, the record would be
entered once and then be available automatically for all authorized uses. With
this efficiency in assembling and matching data, there would be far less
burden on individuals who wish to apply for government benefits, enter into
a contract with any government unit, file a report in connection with
environmental or other regulatory programs, or otherwise transfer
information to the government. Better coordination might also be possible
between governments at the local, state, national, and even international
levels.
In the private sector, free flows of financial data also create efficiency
gains. From a seller’s point of view, detailed information about the buyer
allows more efficient provision of goods and services. Detailed information
permits “one-to-one” marketing, so buyers get precisely what they most
value, and so sellers can avoid unwanted inventory and can produce exactly
what buyers want.87 Ever-expanding computing power and the growth of the
Internet mean that the costs of assembling, processing, and communicating
personal data continue to fall rapidly. As the private sector develops new
means for processing personal information, the information also becomes
potentially available to the government.
87. On personalized marketing, see DON PEPPERS & MARTHA ROGERS, THE ONE TO ONE
FUTURE: BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS ONE CUSTOMER AT A TIME (1993). For an analysis of the
advantages and disadvantages of personalized marketing from a privacy point of view, see SWIRE &
LITAN, supra note 1, at 142-44. In economic terms, detailed information about buyers can allow sellers
to price discriminate more effectively, with efficiency gains resulting from the more precise matching
of buyers’ wants with sellers’ products.
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In the area of information processing, the public and private sectors are
linked more closely than is often realized. Any data in private hands are only
a subpoena away from the government. The efficiency gains in the private
sector mean efficiency gains for law enforcement and the government more
generally. The new flood of potentially available data, however, raises the
possibility of disadvantages of government access to financial transactions. It
is to these possible disadvantages that we now turn.
IV. DISADVANTAGES OF FLOWS OF FINANCIAL DATA TO GOVERNMENT
As the possible disadvantages of data flows are considered, it may help to
imagine that the pipeline of data is going to three sorts of recipients: to the
head of the FBI, such as J. Edgar Hoover; to every law enforcement official
in the United States, as part of a database for investigating crimes; and to
senior officials in a foreign dictatorship, who may use the data to enrich
themselves and maintain themselves in power. One can hope and pray that
worst-case scenarios do not occur. But contemplating the rogue government
official, who might abuse private information, serves the same analytic
purpose as contemplating the drug cartel or dangerous terrorist, whose bad
acts might justify massive invasions of privacy. In both cases, examination of
unusual scenarios clarifies the advantages or disadvantages of creating
pipelines out of the vault. Once we understand the sorts of good and bad
things that can result from data flows, we have a better understanding of what
empirical questions to ask when designing or regulating a particular system
of data flows.
A. Self-Interested Acts by Officials
Government officials might use the data to which they have access for
personal financial gain, for political gain, or out of mere curiosity or
prurience.
1. Financial Gain
Officials might gain financially from their access to other people’s
detailed financial records. First, the officials might use the data in their own
business dealings. Access to detailed financial records might reveal
confidential business information or otherwise give officials an advantage in
choosing their own investments. Second, officials might get money from
people who do not want their financial transactions revealed. When the
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outside person approaches the official with an offer to pay hush money, the
crime is called bribery.88 An official might be bribed, for instance, not to
collect all of the taxes legally due. When the official approaches the outside
person for money, and threatens to reveal embarrassing or incriminating
information, the crime is called extortion or blackmail.89 A comprehensive
database with every individuals’ transactions might provide many
opportunities for such blackmail. Third, officials might benefit financially by
sharing the data with outside parties, who might pay an official for the data
and then use the data for their own purposes. Sharing data with outside
parties might also open up investments for officials that they could not
otherwise afford. For instance, if confidential data revealed that a piece of
expensive property would soon rise in value, then an official might join up
with other “investors” to purchase the property.
In general, the greater the economic value of the data confided in
officials, the greater the incentive for outside parties to corrupt those officials.
A comprehensive database of transactions conducted by Americans would
seem to be quite valuable, raising serious issues about how effectively such a
database could be guarded over time. At a minimum, pipelines of
information out of the vault and storage of data on the surface would have to
be guarded carefully. For instance, good audit trails should exist for those
who access the database, in an attempt to deter and detect illegal access to it.
2. Political Gain, Including Discrimination
Information is power, especially in the hands of powerful officials. The
patterns of misuse for political gain track those for financial gain. First, the
officials might use the data in their political dealings. The data may be an
inexpensive and effective form of opposition research, and give officials
inside information to make them more effective in achieving their political
goals. Second, officials might use the inside information to extract
concessions from the targets of surveillance, the way that J. Edgar Hoover
apparently used secret files to protect his tenure in office and to influence
policy debates. Third, officials might benefit politically by sharing the data
with friendly outside parties. In wiretap scandals involving the Los Angeles
police in the early 1980s, the police allegedly leaked confidential data to
allies in right-wing political groups.90
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994) (defining “bribery”).
89. See id. § 1951 (defining “extortion” and related terms).
90. See Marc Cooper, Wired (last visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.newtimesla.com/
1998/081398/feature1-1.html>.
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The possibility of leaks of this sort reminds us how personal data can be
used to discriminate against individuals and groups. The most infamous
example is likely the Nazi insistence in the 1930s that Jews give detailed
reports of their financial assets. The Nazis then used these reports as part of a
systematic program to seize Jewish assets.91 Mor  ubtly, officials might use
control over detailed financial information to favor or disfavor groups in the
release of sensitive political data, the administration of regulatory programs,
the award of government contracts, or otherwise. As Oscar H. Gandy, Jr. has
explained, the “panoptic sort” of modern information systems “is a
discriminatory technology that assigns people to groups of winners and
losers on the basis of countless bits of personal information that have been
collected, stored, processed, and shared through an intelligent network.”92
3. Prurience
In addition to financial or political gain from the data, officials might
snoop in personal financial records out of prurience or mere curiosity. There
have been recurring revelations that IRS employees have gained
unauthorized access to the tax returns of neighbors, celebrities, and others.93
If officials also get complete access to the purchasing records of individuals,
we might recognize the all-too-human temptation to see, for instance,
precisely what was bought for a party in the home of a movie star or a
prominent Senator. (And we might not be surprised if such details at least
occasionally made their way into the supermarket tabloids.)
This sort of potential surveillance is chilling, in at least two respects. First,
it sends a chill down the spine to think that their every move is subject to this
sort of examination by unknown others. Life is less free and carefree when
91. For a discussion of this process of “Arisierung” (Aryanization), see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
HOLOCAUST 84-87 (Isreal Guttman ed., 1990); KARL A. SCHLEUNES, THE TWISTED ROAD TO
AUSCHWITZ: NAZI POLICY TOWARD GERMAN JEWS 133-85 (1970).
92. Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., It’s Discrimination, Stupid!, in RESISTING THE VIRTUAL LIFE 35, 36
(James Brook & Iain A. Boal eds., 1995).
93. One report found 1,515 “browsing” cases at the Internal Revenue Service in 1994 and 1995.
Those whose files were accessed included Elizabeth Taylor, Dolly Parton, and President Clinton. One
IRS employee was accused of spying on the records of Elvis Presley years after he died. Another IRS
employee pled guilty to charges of looking up the salaries of a friend’s coworkers to help the friend in
a salary dispute at work. See Michael James, Former IRS Clerk Pleads Guilty to Giving Friend
Confidential Information, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 3, 1998, at 2B.
In the wake of such revelations, Congress enacted legislation in 1997 to make browsing a felony.
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7213A (West Supp. 1998). The IRS has also instituted employee training programs.
In 1994 the IRS disciplined 420 employees for browsing. This figure dropped to 371 in 1995 and 233
in 1996. See Rob Wells, Congress Proposing Criminal Penalties on IRS Snoops, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 7, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4860913.
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one’s every move is being tracked. Second, the surveillance may chill
legitimate and desirable activity that would otherwise take place. For
example, if financial records would reveal that a politician has seen a
psychiatrist, and that revelation would be politically damaging, then the
politician might not seek necessary medical help. As discussed above, courts
in interpreting the First Amendment, have often struck down government
controls over the flow of information as “chilling” of protected speech.
Similarly, government insistence on tracking personal data can also chill
legitimate activities of citizens.
B. Illegal but Non-Self-Interested Acts by Officials
The discussion of financial gain, political gain, and prurience assumed
that officials were acting out of self-interest, pursuing their own interests
rather than those of their principals, the government, and ultimately the
people. Officials also might use financial data in the attempt to achieve what
they believe to be good policy. An example might be an over-zealous
prosecutor, who might use illegally-obtained financial information entirely in
order to convict a criminal, with no thought of personal advancement.
An example of this sort of behavior recently surfaced in connection with
hundreds of illegal “hand offs” of wiretapped phone conversations in Los
Angeles.94 Although there is no publicly available evidence that law
enforcement officials used the information for personal gain, they did violate
the rules restricting government surveillance. Those rules emanated from a
constitutional or political judgment that the risks to privacy from certain
types of surveillance outweighed the benefits of surveillance. When the
government breaks its own privacy rules, there are privacy harms to all those,
including the innocent, who were illegally put under surveillance. Citizens
may lose trust in the government’s general handling of personal information.
More broadly, violation of the government’s own rules cast doubt on the rule
of law and the legitimacy of the government.
C. Access by Unauthorized Third Parties
In considering the disadvantages of access, the analysis thus far has
focused on government officials who were authorized to see information but
94. “Hand offs” involve information from a wiretap of Person A illegally being used to start
investigations about Person B, without revealing to B’s defense counsel or anyone else that the tip
originated from a wiretap. For financial information, analogous illegal snooping might reveal both
petty and significant violations of tax and other laws. See Cooper, supra note 90.
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used it in impermissible ways, such as for financial or political gain. As
discussed in Part I, however, in connection with identity fraud, a major
potential problem of government access to financial data is that the
information may flow to unauthorized third parties (“UTPs”).
In weighing the risks posed by UTPs, consider once again the difference
between the impregnable vault 600 feet down and a flimsy shack housing
data on the surface. Next think about the risks of disclosure when every law
enforcement official in the United States has instant access to a category of
information, such as arrest records, Currency Transaction Reports, or, in the
future, the credit or debit card records of a criminal suspect. Among all the
prosecutors, police officers, and clerks with access to such data, there will be
some weak links or flimsy shacks. Some of them will seek personal or
financial gain from their access to the data. UTPs will have many potential
targets as they seek to find a “friendly” insider or a bribable one.
Even in the absence of a friendly insider, the government computer
systems may not be secure. Skilled hackers may be able to tap the pipelines
from the vault to the surface. Even more likely, they may be able to penetrate
the defenses of the surface installation. The Defense Department reports
hundreds of thousands of successful intrusions into military computers per
year.95 The actual damage caused by these intrusions is difficult to assess—
many of the intrusions are undoubtedly done by teenagers and others who get
access to part of a system but do not steal any sensitive data. The possibility
of intrusions, nonetheless, is a powerful argument against allowing unlimited
government access to sensitive personal information of any kind, including
detailed financial information. If every law enforcement official in the
country can access the data, then determined UTPs can, too.
D. Public Choice and “Mission Creep”
The uses and misuses of data evolve over time. The systems in place in
one period can have a powerful effect on what systems will develop in
subsequent periods. On the side of favoring government use of personal
information, new uses of data may later become desirable once a system for
collecting and disseminating the information is already in place. This
argument is based on the idea of economies of scale. Once the costs of the
database and infrastructure are already incurred for initial purposes, then
additional uses may be cost-justified that would otherwise not have been.
95. See, e.g., Tim Phillips, Bits Krieg, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 22, 1997, at 12 (quoting
U.S. Defense Department official Robert Ayers as having said “I believe between a quarter and a half
a million successful intrusions occurred in the US military computers in 1995.”).
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As an example, consider the argument that tax return information should
be used by government agencies other than the Internal Revenue Service, in
order to reduce the risk that well-off people will fraudulently receive
government benefits. The economies of scale argument would point out that
costs have already been incurred in the tax system to gather and organize the
tax return data. Once those expenditures have already been made, there is a
low incremental expense to transfer the data to other federal agencies and
perhaps to state and local welfare and other agencies. An efficiency argument
can then be made that additional uses of data, such as protecting against
welfare fraud, should be authorized where the costs of gathering and
organizing the comprehensive tax data would not have been justified solely
to protect against welfare fraud.96
Although the economies of scale argument may be persuasive in some
contexts, there are powerful counterarguments. For privacy advocates, the
additional uses (and misuses) of data are examples of “mission creep,” or a
slippery slope down to a complete loss of privacy of highly personal
information. Used in the context of the Vietnam War, mission creep refers to
the risk that initial and justifiable government actions, such as collecting tax
information or having a limited mission in South Vietnam, can evolve into
unjustified and potentially tragic actions. If mission creep continues
unchecked, tax returns might become essentially public documents. In
recognition of this problem, there are federal laws restricting use of tax
returns for other purposes.97
Privacy advocates have a large and probably often justified concern about
mission creep. When the Social Security Number (“SSN”) was introduced
during the New Deal, for instance, promises were made that it would not be
used as a national ID card.98 Over time, however, SSNs have been used for
an array of new uses. A proposed rule by the Department of Transportation,
pursuant to a 1996 law, would take a major step toward using SSNs as
national identity numbers. The proposed rule would mandate that state
driver’s licenses must contain SSNs to be acceptable for a range of
96. For a version of this argument, see Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the
Hands of Government: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
OF RTS. J. 455 (1995).
97. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1994).
98. In some settings, people “can be treated as criminals if they refuse to supply Social Security
numbers, which President Franklin D. Roosevelt assured us would never be used for anything other
than Social Security.” Lisa S. Dean, Q: Is a Nationwide Network for Immunization Records a Good
Idea?; No: A Boon to Big Brother, This Effort Will Compromise Personal Liberty and Violate Privacy,
WASH. TIMES, July 27, 1998, Symposium, at 24; see generally ARTHUR ABRAHAM & DAVID L.
KOPELMAN, FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURITY 141-143 (1998).
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identification purposes, including boarding an airplane, being eligible for
federal benefits, and purchasing a gun.99
The importance of the mission creep argument is heightened by an
examination of the politics of privacy issues. In other countries, privacy laws
have been decisively shaped by political mobilization against relatively
simple and easily-understood threats to privacy. Prominent examples are the
Australian defeat of a national ID card in the 1980s100 and the German
resistance to what were perceived as intrusive census questions in 1983 and
1987.101 A 1996 law in the United States to create a national medical ID card
similarly has met with significant opposition, and the Clinton Administration
has stated that it will oppose implementation of such a card, until and unless
broad new medical privacy legislation is enacted.102
In short, there is evidence that the political system may protect privacy
relatively robustly when the issue is considered at the threshold, on the up-or-
down question of whether an identification card should be created or some
other surveillance project put into place. By contrast, a detailed and
persuasive report on the American experience shows how difficult it has been
for privacy advocates to succeed legislatively in the last two decades on less
visible and more complicated privacy issues.103 If th  government (or private
sector) already has fifteen uses for a category of data, it may be impossible
politically to stop the sixteenth or seventeenth uses, even where those
additional uses would never have been approved at the time the data
collection system was first instituted.104
99. Jon E. Dougherty, Controversy Swirls Around Repeal of National ID Law, USA J. ONLINE,
Aug. 5, 1998.
100. See SIMON DAVIES, BIG BROTHER: AUSTRALIA’S GROWING WEB OF SURVEILLANCE (1992).
101. See DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 79-83 (1989).
The political mobilization in connection with the German census was a key factor in the adoption of
German data protection laws, which are among the most protective of privacy in the world. See id. at
82-83.
102. See Bill Nichols, Gore Makes Protecting Consumer Privacy a Priority, USA TODAY, July
31, 1998, at 6A (discussing Vice President Gore’s speech announcing delay of national health
identification program absent passage of new medical privacy laws).
103. See The Center for Public Integrity, Nothing Sacred: The Politics of Privacy (last modified
July 28, 1998) <http://www.publicintegrity.org/nothing_sacred.html>.
104. The political analysis here is consistent with the predictions of public choice theory. In
privacy debates, concentrated costs arise from restrictions on the government agencies or private-
sector parties that wish to use the information. The benefits of privacy protection, by contrast, are
diffused across the general population. For low-visibility and complex issues, the public is not likely to
mobilize effectively to defeat the groups that would suffer concentrated costs from legislation. By
contrast, the views of the general population are more likely to be effective politically for more easily-
understood and salient privacy issues, such as the national ID card. For the public choice analysis, see
Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990).
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The historical examples of mission creep and the political history of
privacy legislation return us to the “privacy paradox” discussed in the
Introduction to this Article. The paradox suggested that, in the long term and
taking a broad view, most people are concerned about invasions of privacy
that might result from government access to sensitive financial and other
records. But in the short term, when particular uses of data are at stake, the
political system and many people prefer to let the information be used rather
than to uphold privacy values.
The discussion here of the public choice of privacy legislation suggests
important arguments for being cautious about expanding the government’s
access to personal information. Proposals for access should not be considered
solely as a static matter, by evaluating only whether a particular pipeline is
worth constructing. Instead, careful thought should also be given to a
dynamic analysis of how data flows are likely to develop over time. Political
mobilization on privacy seems more effective at the start, when a new mode
of surveillance is being introduced, than in the detailed and technical debates
that follow later.
E. Effects on Other Countries: The United States as a Beacon of Liberty?
The discussion thus far has focused on the effects within the United States
of allowing or prohibiting pipelines of financial information to the
government. This section considers how U.S. adoption of surveillance
technologies may influence the surveillance technologies used in other
countries, against both U.S. citizens and citizens of other countries.
It is possible, although not likely, that adoption of surveillance
technologies within the United States will have positive effects in other
countries. Supporters of traceable systems in the United States argue that
such systems may help Colombia develop records about its drug cartels,
perhaps eventually contributing to effective enforcement against the cartels.
Similarly, traceable financial transactions might put pressure on criminals
who take advantage of the banking and tax havens in the Caribbean and
elsewhere. Transfers into the havens might become easier for authorities to
detect, reducing the evasion of laws in the onshore countries. More generally,
transactions by government officials would become more traceable,
providing a possibility of accountability against corrupt officials. A future
Ferdinand Marcos, for instance, might find it harder to hide large sums of
money outside of the country.
On the other hand, it is far from clear that this gain in accountability
would outweigh the ways that corrupt officials, in control of surveillance,
could profit by using surveillance technologies against their citizens or ours.
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It is possible that powerful new surveillance tools will be used to hold the
powerful accountable. Study of the history of tyranny, however, suggests
instead that powerful new tools will be used by the powerful and against the
weak.
To assess the effects of U.S. adoption of surveillance technologies on
other countries, consider both the technological and political reasons that
U.S. policy may influence adoption in other countries. Consider, for instance,
a U.S. law prohibiting anonymous electronic cash, or a U.S. banking policy
that strongly encourages a fully traceable electronic payments system. As a
technological matter, research and development in the United States is
unlikely to focus on products that are illegal or discouraged in the United
States. Similarly, research and development elsewhere in the world will be
done with at least one eye on the U.S. market, the largest in the world. New
technologies are thus likely to be consistent with the requirements of the U.S.
market.105
The effect of U.S.-compliant technology on global payments systems is
likely to be even greater for two other reasons. First, many international
financial transactions originate, terminate, or pass through the domestic or
international offices of U.S. financial institutions. These banks or other
institutions are likely to have systems in place, even for their foreign offices,
that are generally consistent with U.S. law. Second, the economics of
computer systems, such as for a payments system, often seems to lead to
dominance by one or a very few suppliers. For payments systems, there are
probably important “network externalities,” where the value of the payments
hardware or software increases as others use the same system.106 Automa ic
teller machine cards, credit cards, and debit cards all become more useful the
105. Even an apparent exception to the focus on the U.S. market turns out to reinforce the point.
Strong cryptographic products (products that are difficult or impossible to decode) are an example, as
of early 1999, where major research efforts are being undertaken outside of the United States.
A key reason why non-U.S. research is especially prominent for cryptography is that strong
cryptography remains legal within the United States. United States restrictions today apply to exports
of strong cryptography from the United States. A non-U.S. producer can thus sell cryptographic
products world-wide, making it worth undertaking the research.
For most other actions subject to government surveillance, there is no similar advantage to having
the product come from outside the United States. As emphasized in the text, if a payment mechanism
or type of cellular phone cannot be used in the United States, then non-U.S. companies will likely
choose U.S.-compliant technology rather than technology that is discouraged or illegal in the United
States.
106. “Network externalities” exist where the value that purchasers place on a good increases as
others buy the good. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998). Such network effects are familiar from the fact that
telephones, e-mail, and fax machines all become more useful as more people have compatible
equipment.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p461 Swire.doc 07/27/99  10:58 AM
502 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:461
more places accept a particular card. The same will be true of new Internet or
other electronic payment systems. Where such network effects exist, the
major international payments systems will almost certainly be usable in a
major market such as the United States.107
The effects on other countries of U.S.-compliant technology are likely
magnified by the effects of U.S. political actions. There are many subtle and
not-so-subtle ways that the U.S. Government can encourage other countries
to adopt measures that support surveillance. A notable example is the long-
running diplomatic effort to convince other countries to implement anti-
money laundering measures. Some countries, such as Switzerland, have
recently and substantially expanded government access to previously-private
financial information. In light of the unique role of the United States as a
military, political, and financial superpower, other countries may find it
easier to go along with U.S. surveillance initiatives than to risk a diplomatic
fight.
Perhaps just as significantly, the U.S. decision to adopt surveillance
technologies may make other countries more likely to use such technologies,
even where the United States does not use diplomatic muscle on an issue. I
call this the “Beacon of Liberty” argument, which has not been given the
prominence it deserves in debates about surveillance. The “Beacon of
Liberty” argument invokes the image of the Statue of Liberty in New York
harbor. The upraised torch is a shining light unto the nations of the world,
promising hope and liberty to all who see its beacon. With its Bill of Rights,
its judicial and political protections against abuses of government power, and
its civic tradition of individual freedom, the United States has a profound
symbolic role, at home and abroad, as a guarantor of freedom.
Without seeking to romanticize history, the United States has often played
an important role in seeking to promote freedom and democracy around the
world. The United States has given a home to many immigrants and political
refugees fleeing tyranny in their home countries. After World War II, the
United States helped rebuild war-torn Japan and Western Europe into stable
and prosperous democracies. Despite the strenuous objections of its British
ally, the United States supported decolonization and the creation of
democracies in the former colonies. During the Cold War, the United States
used the rhetoric of freedom to oppose Communist countries that established
secret police and pervasive surveillance over citizens’ lives. More recently,
the United States has supported democratization in countries all over the
world. The list could go on.
107. Id. at 507-15 (discussing the network externalities of ATM and credit or debit cards).
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With this legacy as a Beacon of Liberty, one might expect that the United
States would use its moral authority to oppose the creation of government
surveillance systems around the world. The United States might lead by
example, permitting or encouraging technologies that promote privacy and
individual freedom. The United States might encourage or require freedom-
enhancing technologies, which would spread abroad. The United States
might also employ its moral authority and diplomatic tools against
surveillance. A model here could be the U.S. efforts to encourage human
rights in other countries. For example, the United States can deliver foreign
aid to countries only where the State Department finds a satisfactory human
rights record.
Instead of applying its weight on the side of liberty, however, the United
States is becoming a leader in requiring surveillance technologies. United
States deployment of such technologies can embolden authoritarian regimes
to deploy the same technologies and weaken U.S. complaints against
authoritarianism. The moral authority of the United States will be on the side
of government power rather than on the side of individual liberty.
For financial records, the clear example once again is U.S. insistence that
strict money laundering laws be enforced at home and abroad. These laws
provide governments easy and unprecedented access to information about
many financial transactions. United States support for money laundering
laws, moreover, makes it far more difficult to create anonymous payments
systems over the Internet. As payments inevitably migrate over time to the
Internet or other electronic means, individuals lose the ability to pay
untraceably in cash. The requirements of money laundering laws, meant to
stop a relatively small number of criminals, lead to the result that records of
all electronic payments become available to the government.
The Beacon of Liberty argument is even more evident in the debate about
“key escrow” proposals, such as those supported by the FBI. The FBI would
like to receive the keys that would allow the government to open encrypted
files. These keys would be available to the government on a real-time basis,
so that the government could break into coded e-mail or hard drives without
the knowledge of those writing or receiving the files. Key escrow, the current
version of the “Clipper Chip” proposal,108 h s been enormously
controversial, in part because it is designed to allow holders of the keys to
read any message that falls into the key-holders’ hands.
Key escrow is thus another example of U.S. leadership in seeking to
108. For a legal and factual discussion of the Clipper Chip, see Froomkin, supra note 78, at 709-
897.
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spread a surveillance technology to other countries. The U.S. Government
has tried, with little success to date, to have other countries agree to a key
escrow plan. One reason for the resistance is the reluctance of other countries
to have the communications of their own citizens available to the U.S.
Government. It remains quite possible, however, that law enforcement
concerns will eventually be built into the infrastructure of encrypted files.
For both money laundering and key escrow, the United States is using its
leadership on high technology and its diplomatic muscle to try to increase
government surveillance of individuals. In addition, the harm to liberty in
other countries may be more acute than in the United States itself. Other
countries often do not offer legal protections to the individual that match
those within the United States. In the United States, under current key escrow
proposals, there would be a warrant requirement and other judicial oversight
of investigations and prosecutions. Many countries give their officials greater
access to data than is permitted in the United States. In some countries, there
is a greater likelihood of corrupt officials, who will access the data
themselves or make the data available to cronies. If we see the spread of key
escrow and traceable financial transactions, as supported by the United
States, then abuse of power by government officials will also spread,
especially in the many countries that lack effective checks on government
power.
In sum, there are strong technological and political reasons to expect U.S.
adoption of surveillance technologies to influence other countries to adopt
those technologies. As a logical matter, one might argue that the United
States should use these technologies, because adequate protections exist in
the United States to control abuse. The United States might then serve its
historical role as a Beacon of Liberty to other countries, arguing against
adoption of surveillance techniques in countries that do not enforce the rights
of individuals. As a practical matter, and in order to avoid being labeled a
hypocrite, U.S. adoption of surveillance tools will tend to increase use of the
tools elsewhere, especially when the United States applies diplomatic
pressure on other countries.
Within the broader inquiry of this Article, concerning the advantages and
disadvantages of government access to data, the Beacon of Liberty argument
suggests that U.S. adoption of surveillance tools can have significant
negative effects elsewhere in the world. Those negative effects deserve
careful consideration in U.S. deliberations about allowing pipelines of data to
the U.S. Government. The concern is that the problems arising from
traceability, which perhaps can be controlled within the United States, will
turn out to be more pervasive in other countries. Instead of serving as a
Beacon of Liberty, the United States instead might foster the creation of an
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unprecedented system of global surveillance.
F. Distribution and Discrimination Issues
New surveillance technologies may have disproportionate impacts on
different economic classes or racial or other groups. Earlier, in discussing
self-interested acts of officials, the focus was on misuse of office to harm
individuals or disfavored groups, such as occurred to Jews under the Nazi
regime. The risk, in such circumstance, is that officials will use their access
to financial data for their own economic and political gain, including the
benefit of helping groups they favor and hurting groups they disfavor.
In addition to this sort of intentional discrimination, facially neutral uses
of surveillance can have disparate impacts on racial or other groups.
Professor Dorothy Roberts highlights this problem in her description of
“welfare as a waiver of privacy.”109 Women welfare recipients, especially
African-American women, have been the subject of detailed means and
moral testing as a condition of receiving public assistance. Such testing
“forces recipients to assume a submissive stance lest offended caseworkers
cut them from the rolls. . . . Because families are not entitled to government
support, the Supreme Court has reasoned, the government may force them to
open up for inspection, shrink, rearrange, or break up in order to qualify for
benefits.”110 Roberts concludes that welfare recipients are treated as
“subjects” instead of “citizens”: “While poor single mothers (subjects) must
endure government surveillance for their paltry benefits, ‘self-sufficient’
traditional families (citizens) receive huge public subsidies—Social Security,
tax breaks, and government-backed mortgages—without any loss of
privacy.”111
As government benefits shift from monthly checks to electronic benefits
transfers (“EBT”), a new level of intrusion into the lives of those who receive
welfare and other payments becomes possible. Previously, recipients could
anonymously cash their checks or spend their food stamps. That is, the
transaction did not link the individual to the purchase. With EBT, a
permanent record of precisely what the person does with the government
109. Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563,
1579 (1996). Along with the sources cited in her discussion of privacy, Roberts reviews two books that
document the intrusions into the privacy of welfare recipients, and especially African-American
recipients, that welfare programs have historically permitted. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT
ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994); JILL QUADAGNO,
THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994).
110. Roberts, supra note 109, at 1579-80 (footnote omitted).
111. Id. (footnote omitted).
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benefit often will be created. This record system then has the potential to
produce the full range of harms discussed in Part I: the harm itself (for
example, a person inadvertently buys an ineligible product and thus loses
food stamps); chilling effects (for example, eligible people refuse to accept
benefits because of their fear of surveillance); cloaking effects (for example,
elaborate barter arrangements emerge so that different purchasers can each
buy the goods they want); and the burden of complying with surveillance
(notably, negative feelings such as powerlessness from being subject to such
surveillance).
Of course, some of these “harms” from surveillance are also advantages.
Transactional records can reduce purchases of ineligible goods and purchases
by ineligible recipients. That said, it should only take a small degree of
empathy for most people to understand how burdensome it may feel to have
one’s every purchase potentially scrutinized by government officials,
knowing that mistakes in purchasing could lead to loss of badly-needed
income. As EBT programs are implemented, attention should be paid to the
potentially large privacy implications. Good procedures should be created to
limit officials’ possible abuses of this new flow of information. For example,
similar to tax returns, officials should not be permitted to browse in benefits
records without a legitimate need to know. Where possible, an anonymity or
cash-like option should be considered, so that poor people are not required to
have their purchases tracked more than other people’s purchases.
Additionally, the agency should communicate the available privacy
protections to recipients, so that recipients do not perceive risks of
surveillance that do not actually exist.
The EBT discussion illustrates the disparate effects that can result from
new surveillance technologies. Some surveillance systems, such as EBT for
food stamps, apply predominantly to the poor and to minority groups that are
disproportionately poor. The rich, the well-educated, and the savvy may also
have ways, unavailable to the poor, to avoid or reduce government
surveillance. Dummy corporations and off-shore accounts—prerequisites of
the wealthy and sophisticated—can be effective in hiding one’s financial
transactions. Wealthy families today often help their children establish good
credit histories, such as by paying off a credit card debt or helping with the
down payment on a house.112 In the future, these same families may train
112. Such efforts by the well-to-do can have important effects over time in the creditworthiness of
their children and their consequent average level of financial success. See Peter P. Swire, Equality of
Opportunity and Investment in Creditworthiness, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 1533, 1542 (1995). In the
future, a similar advantage may arise for the children of well-educated or wealthy families—that is,
training in how to avoid leaving embarrassing records of purchases made in adolescence and
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their children how not to leave a trail of embarrassing transaction records. As
the next generation of surveillance systems develop, with their attendant risks
for the individuals under surveillance, there will likely be disproportionate
harms to certain groups resulting from such surveillance.
G. The First Amendment and Other Democratic Values
In presenting the anatomy of privacy harms, Part I discussed how First
Amendment values are implicated by government and private-sector access
to each book and web page that an individual has accessed. Such First
Amendment concerns illustrate the way that highly traceable financial
transactions can have important implications outside of the financial realm.
By tracking the previously untraceable, financial records may reveal any
number of things that were heretofore private. In considering the advantages
or disadvantages of a pipeline out of the data vault, it is appropriate to think
carefully about the range of effects of new uses of data.
In our most pessimistic moments, we might even contemplate how
tracking of all financial transactions, perhaps combined with other forms of
high-tech surveillance, might contribute to an increased risk of tyranny in a
society. It is difficult to imagine how to study such an increased risk
empirically; nonetheless, one source of freedom historically has been the
necessary inefficiency of surveillance systems.113 With better technology,
society faces more explicit choices about whether categories of data will
enter the vault and about what rules will govern access to the vault. If a
society repeatedly opts for surveillance rather than privacy, then the nature of
that society may change over time. That concern is an organizing theme of
Alan Westin’s classic book Privacy and Freedom.114 As we look at vast new
accumulations of financial records, or of other potentially revealing personal
information, thought should be given to what other values, including the
preservation of a free society, may in some way be at stake.
V. LESSONS FOR THE THEORY OF HIGH-TECH GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE
This concluding Part summarizes the analysis on government access to
financial transaction records. It then shows how the same arguments can be
afterward.
113. My thanks to Larry Lessig for making the analogous point about how fair use in the
intellectual property realm has historically been based on the inefficiency of the copyright monitoring
systems available to copyright holders.
114. WESTIN, supra note 18.
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used more generally to assess other forms of high-tech government
surveillance and offers concluding thoughts.
A. Summary on Financial Transaction Records
 The discussion to this point has focused on government having access to
a certain sort of information—detailed records of what individuals have
purchased. Part I showed reasons to believe that a much greater portion of
financial transactions will be traceable over time. Part II introduced the
metaphor of the vault 600 feet down. Once data is in the vault, legal and
political decisions must be made about when and under what conditions to
allow pipelines out of the vault. The anonymity option was also introduced
because data can be filtered before it enters the vault.
 Part III discussed the advantages of providing the government access to
financial transaction records. The government has especially strong
arguments for access with respect to its own financial transactions, such as
tax receipts and grants of government benefits. The government can seek
access for law enforcement purposes, to detect, deter, and punish illegality.
More generally, the government (and the private sector) can make an
efficiency argument that data be used where the marginal benefits of its use
exceed the marginal costs.
 In response, Part IV discussed the disadvantages of government access to
this information. Officials might misuse the data, either for personal gain or
out of an over-zealous desire to enforce the laws. Unauthorized third parties
might misuse the data, for identity theft or other purposes. Public choice
problems might lead to excessive access over time, as initially-justifiable
uses of data become subject to overuse and mission creep. Decisions by the
United States might have significant effects on data use in other countries,
especially if the U.S. abandons its historical role as a beacon of liberty and
instead encourages the use of surveillance technologies in other countries.
Stepped-up surveillance can have troublesome distributional effects and
result in racial or other discriminatory effects. Finally, the comprehensive
tracking of financial records can implicate First Amendment and other
values, potentially contributing in the long run to a less free society.
 This list of potential harms in Part IV fleshes out the anatomy of privacy
harms developed in Part I. For each the harms addressed in Part IV, the first
and most obvious worry is the harm itself—from abuse of government office,
identity theft, intrusion on First Amendment values, or whatever. Second,
surveillance might lead to chilling effects, or actions foregone due to
concerns about privacy. Third, surveillance might lead to cloaking costs, or
actions taken to evade surveillance. Finally, there can be burdens of
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complying with surveillance, from the time spent filling out mandatory
questionnaires to the emotional strains that can result from being under
observation.
B. Other High-Tech Government Surveillance
The advantages and disadvantages of government access are not limited
to financial transaction records. The same structure of analysis applies to a
broad sweep of other surveillance technologies that have been and will be
developed. In the past, important databases developed in areas such as credit
histories and lists of telephone calls made by each customer. In response,
statutes were passed to regulate private- and public-sector access to those
databases.115
Today we can perceive a three-step pattern for new systems of high-tech
surveillance. First, new technologies make it potentially feasible and cost-
effective to keep track of events or transactions—to put records into the vault
600 feet down. Second, records in the vault can be linked to individual
names. Third, pipelines then can be readily created for letting information out
of the vault, with persons on the surface using computer networks to search
the vault by name or other criteria.
The use of closed-circuit television (“CCTV”), particularly in Britain,
illustrates this three-step pattern. First, to an extent that would amaze most
Americans, the United Kingdom has already placed CCTV cameras in
almost all central cities as a device to combat crime.116 The pictures taken by
these cameras form the raw material to place in the vault. Second, face-
recognition technology is now being tested that would allow CCTV pictures
to be linked to individual names.117 The third step, readily created once face-
recognition technology becomes proficient, would be to have a searchable
database of every person's movements as tracked by the ubiquitous CCTV
cameras.
The routine tracking of peoples' movements may also be facilitated by the
rapid spread of cellular telephones. Telephone companies today already keep
115. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u (1994 & Supp. III 1997);
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522; Customer Proprietary Network
Information Rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.2001-64.2009 (1998) (FCC rules published pursuant to Telecomm
Act of 1996).
116. See Steven J. Fay, Tough on Crime, Tough on Civil Liberties: Some Negative Aspects of
Britain's Wholesale Adoption of CCTV Surveillance During the 1990s, 12 INT’L REV. L., COMPUTERS
& TECH. 315 (1998); Nick Taylor, Closed Circuit Television: The British Experience, STAN. TECH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1999).
117. See Taylor, supra note 118.
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records of the telephone numbers called by each customer. With cellular
phones, however, companies gain the technical ability to track the location of
the user of the cellular phone—how else can the phone company know
which cell should receive the call?
From cellular phones, it may be only a modest step to wearable devices
that handle other digital functions—access e-mail, keep a person's calendar,
and generally provide all the convenience of a wearable computer. These
devices could be physically trackable through the cellular phone technology
just discussed. The convergence of phone with computers would also
facilitate the automatic collection of many sorts of records. For example, it
might become easy to discover that a particular phone call was made
immediately after a particular e-mail was read. As voice-recognition
technology becomes more useful, the built-in microphone might record some
or all of what the user says during each day. More generally, the wearable
computer-phone would offer incredible convenience to the user as a one-stop
organizer of a person's digital life. It would also offer one-stop convenience
for public- and private-sector actors who wished to keep track of that person's
every digital move.
The examples of high-tech surveillance can be multiplied. E-mails are
available to the government from the Internet Service Provider if it gets a
proper subpoena. Web browsing records can become available as discussed
in this Article. The transaction records kept by merchants and payment
systems can be combined with demographic and psychographic data. And so
on. As the costs of creating, storing, and distributing data continue to
plummet, surveillance systems become feasible which would once have been
unimaginable.
C. Conclusions
As frightening as these surveillance futures might be, so too are there
wonderful benefits from the new technologies. The spread of the Web has
helped many people realize the sweep of possibility that comes with instant
and low-cost access to a worldwide network of (potentially) fascinating
information. From an economic perspective, the stock market's enthusiasm
for electronic commerce companies is based on a belief that individuals will
choose to pay large sums of money in order to participate in new Internet
activities. For those feeling overwhelmed by all of this information, the
wearable computer offers the possibility of having a "digital secretary" that
each person can train to select precisely the information that is of greatest
interest. The science-fiction nightmares of surveillance are twinned with the
science-fiction possibilities of a society brimming with new opportunities.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/6
p461 Swire.doc 07/27/99  10:58 AM
1999] THE THEORY OF HIGH-TECH GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 511
How then are we to think about the new information-collection systems,
for financial records and more generally? This Article cannot offer a general
answer, for all times and places, about when the government should have
access to financial and other records. Instead, the Article systematically sets
forth the chief advantages and disadvantages that should be considered for
each surveillance technology. The chief advantages are efficiency and aid to
law enforcement. The chief disadvantages vary with the circumstances but
include the several arguments explained in Part IV. For CCTV, cellular
phones, and wearable computers, one can consider the harms caused by
privacy invasions, the chilling effects and cloaking costs, and the
psychological and logistical burdens of living under a surveillance system.
In considering the new payment systems and other technologies, the
principal legal and political questions will concern the use of anonymity (to
filter data out before they reach the vault) and procedures (to regulate how
data flow out of the vault to the surface). Concerning anonymity, government
policy can require it, facilitate it, discourage it, or ban it. In this Article,
during the discussion of money laundering in Part III, I recommended
making strong efforts to facilitate anonymous payments over the Internet, at
least for small transactions. This policy would uphold the status quo of
having many ordinary purchases made by cash without leaving a permanent
link to the individual. More generally, opportunities should be explored for
allowing or fostering systems that do not automatically track data unless the
benefits of such tracking clearly outweigh the disadvantages.
Concerning procedures, the American tradition of separation of powers
offers a powerful tradition of having some independent judicial role when the
government seeks access to private financial or other records. Special care is
appropriate where the data concerns groups that may not be well-protected in
the political system, such as recipients of electronic benefits transfers. For
private-sector access to records in the vault, strong security measures are
clearly desirable to prevent identity theft and other unauthorized use.
Individuals likely deserve notice of how data will be used by those
controlling access to the vault. Individuals also should have some ability to
opt out of uses of data where it is reasonable to anticipate that a significant
number of individuals would object to those uses.118
This Article began with the question of how you would like the
government to have access to the records of every purchase you have ever
made. In answering this question, there is no easy status quo on which we
can rely. The old status quo for data privacy was relatively few databases and
118. For my views on private-sector uses of data, see SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 1, at 152-96.
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few laws. Today the number of databases is growing rapidly, along with the
links between them. If we retain a regime of few laws, then the government
will be able to track us in many new and sometimes frightening ways. If we
create a regime of many laws, then we risk cutting off valuable data flows in
this information age.
Surely these are matters that deserve our careful and sustained attention.
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